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I wanted to tell her that if only something were wrong with my
body it would be fine, I would rather have anything wrong with
my body than something wrong with my head, but the idea
seemed so involved and wearisome that I didn’t say anything.
I only burrowed down further in the bed.
—Sylvia Plath, The Bell Jar1
I. INTRODUCTION
For much of human history, ailments of the body received far more
attention than those of the mind.2 Life was hard and survival virtually
impossible without physical health. As more control was exerted over
the environment, and enormous strides made in the ability to treat the
body, greater attention could be given to mental health.3 But while the
response to physical ills increasingly became a science,4 the treatment of
mental illness remained more an art based on speculation and guesswork,
and at times little more than quackery and chicanery.5
Because of the limited understanding of mental illness and how best to
respond to it, few efforts were made to systematically treat it, with afflicted
individuals fortunate to receive respite, asylum, and humane conditions.6
Further, most health care providers were unwilling to devote their careers to
undertaking what typically was seen as a hopeless and unrewarding
endeavor.7 With standards to guide treatment largely absent and a highly
debilitated clientele with virtually no one willing to speak on their behalf, it
is hardly surprising mental health providers have historically been
effectively immune from professional liability claims.8
1. SYLVIA PLATH, THE BELL JAR 182 (25th anniversary ed. 1996).
2. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND
THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 3 (1994). But see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR), at xxx (4th ed. 2000) (“[T]he
term mental disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between ‘mental’ disorders and
‘physical’ disorders that is a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism. A compelling
literature documents that there is much ‘physical’ in ‘mental’ disorders and much ‘mental’ in
‘physical’ disorders.”).
3. See APPELBAUM, supra note 2, at 4.
4. See generally Mark A. Rothstein et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and
Ethical Implications of Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (2009). It should be recognized
that physicians and allied health care providers readily acknowledge that the treatment of
physical illness and injury remains as much an art as a science. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH
PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE 4 (1980).
5. See APPELBAUM, supra note 2, at 8.
6. See id. at 4, 8.
7. See id. at 4–5.
8. Paul S. Appelbaum, Law & Psychiatry: Reforming Malpractice: The Prospects
for Change, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 6, 6 (2011); Henry B. Rothblatt & David H. Leroy,
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Recent developments, however, suggest the gap in the science-based
understanding and treatment of mental health is closing.9 Examples
include the emergence of purported biomarkers pertaining to mental
illness,10 an expanding arsenal of treatments, including a host of newly
Avoiding Psychiatric Malpractice, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 260, 260 (1973); Steven R. Smith,
Mental Health Malpractice in the 1990s, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 209, 212–13 (1991). For
purposes of this Article, the phrase professional liability will be limited to court claims
focusing on the purported inadequate care delivered by a mental health provider. These
providers could also face a parallel claim before their board of licensure. See, e.g., Spitz
v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Psychologists, 12 A.3d 1080, 1083 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (affirming
decision to revoke psychologist’s license for two years). Although an expansion of
professional liability is likely to be accompanied by more disciplinary sanctions, the
latter is beyond the scope of this Article. In addition, a professional liability claim can target
the behavior of the care provider. For example, sexual interactions between a therapist
and a client may be the subject of a liability suit and disciplinary action. See A M .
P SYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS: WITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 2.1 (2010 ed. 2010) (“Sexual activity with a
current or former patient is unethical.”); C. Katherine Mann & John D. Winer, Medical
Negligence—Psychotherapist’s Sexual Contact with Client, in 14 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS
3D 319 § 1 (1991) (“There is a] clear position taken by professional organizations and
legal institutions against sexual contact between psychotherapists and their clients.”). Further,
greater attention has been given of late to the fiduciary duties of care providers, which
also tend to focus on the provider’s behavior rather than the treatment delivered per se.
Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation
of Physicians To “Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services That Are Not
Medically Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 375 n.200 (2009) (“[A] physician may
have a fiduciary duty to keep medical records and information received in the course of
the physician-patient relationship confidential and private, to not engage in a sexual
relationship with a current patient, to avoid conflicts of interests that may compromise
medical judgment, and to disclose to a patient adverse medical conditions of which the
patient is unaware.”). However, these claims are not addressed within this Article as it is
focused instead on emerging treatment developments and their impact on liability.
9. It should be noted similar assertions have been made in the past. For instance,
in the 1970s some psychiatrists felt various psychotropic medications were “miracle drugs.”
See Peter A. Parish, What Influences Have Led to Increased Prescribing of Psychotropic
Drugs?, J. ROYAL C. GEN. PRAC., June 1973, at 49, 49. It was later shown they came with
serious and potentially life-threatening side effects and were not universally effective. See
infra Part IV.
10. See Daniel Z. Buchman & Judy Illes, Imaging Genetics for Our Neurogenetic
Future, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 79 (2010); Deborah W. Denno, Courts’ Increasing
Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal
Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 997–1003; Jeffrey T.-J. Huang et al., Disease
Biomarkers in Cerebrospinal Fluid of Patients with First-Onset Psychosis, 3 PLOS MED.
2145, 2145 (2006), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0030428; Thomas R. Insel, Translating Scientific Opportunity into Public Health Impact:
A Strategic Plan for Research on Mental Illness, 66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 128,
128 (2009) (reporting efforts to close “the gap between the surge in basic biological
knowledge and the state of mental health care”); Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of
the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 585 (2011); Mary L. Phillips & Eduard Vieta, Identifying
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identified medications,11 and increased emphasis on research-based
diagnoses and treatment.12
At the same time, changes in the law and in social norms are eroding
mental health providers’ immunity from liability.13 These include a
clearer delineation of the standard of care,14 a willingness to award
damages for psychological harm,15 and a surge in the number of
governmental actions brought against mental health providers.16

Functional Neuroimaging Biomarkers of Bipolar Disorder: Toward DSM-V, 33
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 893, 893 (2007), available at http://schizophreniabulletin.oxford
journals.org/content/33/4/893.full.pdf+html; Axel Steiger & Mayumi Kimura, Wake and
Sleep EEG Provide Biomarkers in Depression, 44 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 242 (2010),
available at http://www.journalofpsychiatricresearch.com/article/S0022-3956%2809%29001
89-7/abstract; Melissa Healy, Study Finds Telltale Signs of Depression: Biological Markers in
the Bloodstream Offer Hope for Diagnostic Testing of the Disease, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2012, at AA2; Natasha Allen, New Blood Test May Help Detect Schizophrenia: First
Test of Its Kind Looks for Biomarkers for the Mental Illness, NBCNEWS.COM (Oct. 15,
2010, 3:18 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39686973/ns/health-mental_health/t/newblood-test-may-help-detect-schizophrenia/#.UUTYLxycHYQ; see also United States v. Kasim,
No. 2:07 CR 56, 2010 WL 339084, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2010) (“[When making a
competency determination, when c]onfronted with an unreliable [psychiatric] history,
other measures must be considered, specifically biological markers.”). But see Insel, supra, at
128 (“Despite high expectations, neither genomics nor imaging has yet impacted the
diagnosis or treatment [of mental illness].”).
11. See Duff Wilson, A Record Number of Drugs Are Being Tested To Treat Mental
Illness, N.Y. TIMES PRESCRIPTIONS BLOG (July 19, 2010, 3:48 PM), http://prescriptions.
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/a-record-number-of-drugs-are-being-tested-to-treat-mentalillness/; see also infra Part IV.
12. See Phillips & Vieta, supra note 10, at 893 (“The recent research agenda for
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V),
has emphasized a need to translate basic and clinical neuroscience research findings
into a new classification system for all psychiatric disorders . . . .”); Darrel A. Regier et
al., The Conceptual Development of DSM-V, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 645, 646 (2009);
David Watson, Rethinking the Mood and Anxiety Disorders: A Quantitative Hierarchal
Model for DSM-V, 114 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 522 (2005).
13. See Appelbaum, supra note 8, at 6 (“The rate of suits involving claims against
psychiatrists has increased sharply since 1980, with some data suggesting that one in 12
psychiatrists is sued each year.” (citing Carol I. Tsao & Joseph B. Layde, A Basic Review of
Psychiatric Medical Malpractice Law in the United States, 48 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY
309 (2007))).
14. See Robert I. Simon, Standard-of-Care Testimony: Best Practices or Reasonable
Care?, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 8, 9 (2005) (arguing that despite the multitude
of treatment philosophies, “current research has established that certain treatments are more
effective than others”).
15. Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Suffering
Damages, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 437–38 (2009) (“Previously, judges had declined to
recognize emotional distress claims . . . out of a suspicion that such harms were too easily
feigned. Growing acceptance of psychiatric testimony that the plaintiff suffered from a
diagnosable mental illness provided some reassurance of legitimacy.”); John T. Nockleby &
Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1070–80 (2005).
16. See Tom Brown, Miami Health Executive Gets Stiff Sentence for Fraud, REUTERS
(Dec. 9, 2011, 11:42 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/09/us-usa-healthcare-
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A greater number of advocates willing to assist individuals pursuing
these suits is further fueling this change.17
However, arguably the most significant factor contributing to this
increased liability exposure is the empowerment of the recipients of
mental health care.18 This empowerment is in part the result of the
lessened stigma associated with mental illness and claimants’ increased
willingness to acknowledge their condition in open court,19 as well as by
improved treatments that, perhaps ironically, enhance their ability to
pursue tort claims challenging the adequacy of the care they received.20
This evolution creates a conundrum for the courts and society. The
tort system awards damages to claimants to promote good conduct and
deter undesired behavior,21 yet providing mental health treatment has
never been very prestigious or financially rewarding, leaving its
practitioners relatively unresponsive to tort-related incentives.22

fraud-idUSTRE7B81DN20111209 (“[T]he owner of . . . a chain of mental health care
centers . . . was convicted . . . on charges that she helped mastermind what prosecutors
described . . . as ‘one of the largest and most brazen healthcare fraud conspiracies’ in
U.S. history.”); Terri Langford, 3 Arrested in $90 Million Medicare Fraud Scheme, HOUS.
CHRON. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Three-arrested-in90-million-Medicare-fraud-2403896.php; Mo. Psychologist Pleads to Health Care Fraud,
NEWSOK (Aug. 16, 2012), http://newsok.com/mo.-psychologist-pleads-to-health-carefraud/article/feed/420756 (describing guilty plea of psychologist “accused of claiming to
see patients 364 days a year . . . [and] treat[ing] 19 patients almost daily” from 2008 to
April 2012); David Pittman, OIG: Mental Health Centers Need Scrutiny, MEDPAGE TODAY
(Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/medicare/34322 (“Most
community mental health centers employ at least one questionable billing practice, a
government report has found.”); Jay Weaver, Feds Spotlight South Florida’s Mental Health
Clinics for “Questionable Billing” to Medicare, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.
miamiherald.com/2012/08/28/2972637/feds-spotlight-south-floridas.html. Although beyond
the scope of this Article, it can be argued that “[t]he connection between [the] quality of
care, medical malpractice, and compliance [with federal and state operating requirements] is
becoming more established in the health care system.” Richard E. Moses & D. Scott Jones,
Educating Physicians on Fraud and Abuse Compliance Issues, CCH H EALTH
C ARE C OMPLIANCE LETTER (CCH Inc., Riverwoods, Ill.), June 19, 2012, at 4, 4.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979); Alex Stein, Toward a
Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1251 (2012) (“[T]he [medical
malpractice] system . . . brings about an important social benefit by motivating care providers
to deliver adequate treatment to patients.”).
22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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For example, the delivery of mental health care is often financed by
the federal and state governments through Medicaid and Medicare.23
Individuals with a mental illness, as a result of poverty or a disability,24
frequently must rely on these programs for their health care coverage.
However, because of the relatively low reimbursement levels associated
with these programs, physicians are increasingly unwilling to accept
these patients, to the point where prospective patients are finding it
difficult to find physicians who will provide them with care.25
To the extent that the costs of practicing a mental health specialty
increase, whether it be the result of greater liability exposure, reduced
payments, or a diminished sense of appreciation for the work done, it
will become even more difficult to attract qualified individuals to this
practice.26 Further, although mental health professionals will welcome
the progress made in the treatment of mental illness and the increased
respect afforded individuals with a mental illness,27 they will hardly
appreciate second-guessing by the legal system of the oftentimes daunting

23. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE & YOUR MENTAL
HEALTH BENEFITS (2012), available at http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/
10184.pdf; Cynthia Shirk, Medicaid and Mental Health Services 3 (Nat’l Health Policy
Forum, Background Paper No. 66, 2008), available at https://www.nhpf.org/library/
background-papers/BP66_MedicaidMentalHealth_10-23-08.pdf (“Medicaid is the largest
payer of mental health services in the United States . . . .”).
24. See Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., Forging Links and Renewing Ties: Applying
the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice To Better Respond to Criminal Offenders
with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 157 (2012) (“[M]ental illness is the leading
cause of disability in the United States for people between the ages of fifteen and fortyfour.” (citing NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, MENTAL ILLNESSES: TREATMENT
SAVES MONEY & MAKES SENSE 1 (2007))); Esther Entin, Poverty and Mental Health:
Can the 2-Way Connection Be Broken?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:06 AM), http://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/10/poverty-and-mental-health-can-the-2-wayconnection-be-broken/247275/; Mental Health, Poverty and Development, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/development/en/index.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2013).
25. See NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, STATE MENTAL HEALTH CUTS:
A NATIONAL CRISIS 1–10 (2011), available at http://www.nami.org/ContentManagement
/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentFileID=126233; Juliette Cubanski & Patricia Neuman,
Medicare Doesn’t Work As Well for Younger, Disabled Beneficiaries As It Does for Older
Enrollees, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1725 (2010); Sandra L. Decker, In 2011 Nearly One-Third of
Physicians Said They Would Not Accept New Medicaid Patients, but Rising Fees May
Help, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1673 (2012); Julie Connelly, More Doctors Are Opting Out of
Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at F9; Phil Galewitz, Study: Nearly a Third of
Doctors Won’t See New Medicaid Patients, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 6, 2012),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/August/06/Third-Of-Medicaid-Doctors-SayNo-New-Patients.aspx.
26. See Thomas Insel, Psychiatry: Where Are We Going?, NAT’L INST. MENTAL
HEALTH (June 3, 2011), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2011/psychiatry-whereare-we-going.shtml (explaining that only four percent of graduating medical seniors applied to
a postgraduate training program in psychiatry, the lowest rate for all medical specialties).
27. See infra Parts III–IV.

34

[VOL. 50: 29, 2013]

Parity at a Price
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

treatment efforts they undertake.28 Individuals with a mental illness, too,
will likely be torn between applauding the enhanced acceptance of claims of
inadequate mental health services and a fear that the already limited pool
of qualified care providers will be further diminished.29
With these tensions in mind, this Article considers the issues associated
with emerging professional liability claims against mental health care
providers. Part II supplies background information regarding this liability,
including the elements of these claims. Part III details the decreasing
stigma associated with obtaining mental health services and its impact on
professional liability, while Part IV summarizes advancements in mental
health treatment that have enhanced the functional capacities of potential
litigants. The remaining Parts explore changes in the delivery of mental
health care where litigation may be focused, including the increasing use of
psychotropic medications (Part V), the expanding role of primary care
physicians and other health care providers with limited training and
experience pertaining to the treatment of mental illness (Part VI), the
surge in pediatric psychotropic prescriptions (Part VII), the emergence
of the informed consent doctrine and psychiatric advance directives (Part
VIII), and the continuing development of Tarasoff-related liability (Part
IX).
II. PRIMER ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY SUITS TARGETING
MENTAL HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Although professional liability claims against mental health providers
continue to be comparatively infrequent,30 any increased exposure is
significant because of the pervasiveness of mental disorders.31 It is
estimated one in four adults suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in

28. See Gardiner Harris, Talk Doesn’t Pay, So Psychiatry Turns Instead to Drug
Therapy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, at A1 (“[M]y office is like a bus station now . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. See id.; supra note 22 and accompanying text.
30. See Ann H. Britton, Psychotherapy Malpractice, FORUM (Widener Law Health
Law Inst., Wilmington, Del.), Oct. 2010, at 7, 7, available at http://law.widener.edu/
Academics/Institutes/HealthLawInstitute/%7E/media/Files/healthlawnewsletter/healthlaw
forum110810.ashx; see also Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician
Specialty, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 629, 629 (2011).
31. See Michael D. Brophy, Emerging Medical-Legal Issues in the PrescriberPatient Relationship, MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY, June 2001, at 4, 4 (“[F]our of
the 10 leading causes of disability for persons aged 5 and older were mental disorders.”).
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a given year, or approximately fifty-seven million Americans.32 Roughly
half of all Americans will experience a mental illness during their
lifetime,33 and a serious mental disorder afflicts about one out of seventeen
adults.34 The prevalence rates for adolescents “closely approximate”
those of adults,35 as “about one in every three to four children” in the
United States struggles with a mental disorder and around one in ten
experiences “a serious emotional disturbance.”36
Mental health treatment is provided by both physicians—of which
psychiatrists are a subset—and other health care providers, which include
psychologists, social workers, and a range of counselors,37 any of whom
can be the focus of a claim that inadequate mental health care was
delivered.38 Suits targeting nonphysicians are typically referred to as
professional liability claims, while suits aimed at physicians are categorized
as medical malpractice claims.39 Their basic nature is similar,40 although
the terminology may differ somewhat. For example, those who receive

32. See The Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in America, NAT’L INST. MENTAL
HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-disordersin-america/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (citing Ronald C. Kessler et
al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of 12-Month DSM-IV Disorders in the
National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 617 (2005)).
33. William C. Reeves et al., Mental Illness Surveillance Among Adults in the
United States, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Sept. 2, 2011, at 1, 2, available
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6003.pdf.
34. NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 32 (citing Kessler et al., supra note 32).
35. Kathleen Ries Merikangas et al., Lifetime Prevalence of Mental Disorders in
U.S. Adolescents: Results from National Comorbidity Survey Replication—Adolescent
Supplement (NCS-A), 49 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 980, 985 (2010).
36. Id. at 980.
37. See Stephen Hjelt, Informed Consent and Psychotherapy: Apples and Oranges
in the Garden of Doctrine, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 21 (2002).
38. For an overview of mental health law and malpractice, see generally RONALD
JAY COHEN & WILLIAM E. MARIANO, LEGAL GUIDEBOOK IN MENTAL HEALTH (1982);
BARRY R. FURROW, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (1980); THOMAS G. GUTHEIL &
PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1982);
JEFFERY D. ROBERTSON, PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE: LIABILITY OF MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS (1988); and William W. Deardorff et al., Malpractice Liability in
Psychotherapy: Client and Practitioner Perspectives, 15 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC.
590 (1984). For a discussion of the related liability of pharmacists, see Andrew F. Spillane,
Article, Negligence Liability’s Role in Changing Pharmacotherapy Responsibilities, 12
MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 453 (2011); church-related counseling services, see Constance
Frisby Fain, Minimizing Liability for Church-Related Counseling Services: Clergy
Malpractice and First Amendment Religion Clauses, 44 AKRON L. REV. 221 (2011); and
institutions of higher education, see Helen H. de Haven, The Academy and the Public Peril:
Mental Illness, Student Rampage, and Institutional Duty, 37 J. C. & UNIV. L. 267 (2011).
39. See, e.g., Hare v. Wendler, 949 P.2d 1141, 1142 (Kan. 1997) (referring to claim
brought against psychiatrist as medical malpractice claim); Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel,
584 A.2d 69, 71 (Md. 1991) (referring to claim brought against psychologist as professional
negligence claim).
40. See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 160 (2010).
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services from a physician tend to be identified as patients, while the
recipients of treatment from a nonphysician are usually designated as
clients.41 Individuals may receive mental health services from both sets
of professionals, although the services supplied tend to be different.42
Unless noted otherwise, the analyses in this Article are applicable to
both sets of providers.
Rooted in English common law, medical malpractice claims generally
fall within the broad sweep of tort law.43 To pursue such a claim, the
traditional elements of a tort—duty, breach of duty, harm, and proximate
cause—must be satisfied to establish that a health care provider’s
delivery of services to a client was negligent.44 Plaintiffs must establish:
(a) that a physician-patient or therapist-client relationship existed,45
(b) that the mental health provider delivered services not meeting the
applicable standard of care, (c) that the breach of the duty to supply the
requisite level of care caused injury, and (d) that damages should be
awarded to compensate the plaintiff for the harm incurred.46
41. See, e.g., C. W. Ritchie et al., Patient or Client? The Opinions of People Attending
a Psychiatric Clinic, 24 PSYCHIATRIST 447, 447 (2000), available at http://pb.rcpsych.org/
content/24/12/447.full.
42. See Philip Knowles, Collaborative Communication Between Psychologists and
Primary Care Providers, 16 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. MED. SETTINGS 72, 72 (2009); Richard M.
Scheffler & Paul B. Kirby, The Occupational Transformation of the Mental Health System,
22 HEALTH AFF. 177, 185–86 (2003) (discussing how psychiatrists almost exclusively
dispense medicine, while other mental health professionals are relied on for counseling).
43. See 1 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 264 (2d ed. 2000) (“[Suits]
against physicians for medical failures can be found as early as 1375 . . . .”); 4 STUART
M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 15.10, at 526 (Monique C. M. Leahy ed.,
2009). Breach of contract suits can also be filed, but are relatively rare. See, e.g., Owen
v. Appelbaum, 613 N.Y.S.2d 504, 506 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that a plaintiff’s
unsuccessfully filed breach of contract claim against psychiatrist, filed to take advantage
of longer statute of limitations, to be essentially a medical malpractice claim).
44. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
45. See, e.g., White v. Harris, 2011 VT 115, ¶ 4, 190 Vt. 647, 36 A.3d 203, 204–
05. One emerging issue is whether the requisite relationship can be established when the
only interaction was via electronic means. The Vermont Supreme Court recently held that a
one-time, ninety-minute video-conference session as part of a telepsychiatry research study
was sufficient to establish a psychiatrist-patient relationship. Id. ¶ 10, 190 Vt. at 650, 36
A.3d at 207.
46. Lawrence P. Hampton, Note, Malpractice in Psychotherapy: Is There a Relevant
Standard of Care?, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 251, 255–58 (1985); see also 1 THOMAS A.
MOORE & KEVIN P. MCMULLEN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL
§ 2:1.1.B.1 (7th ed. 2012) (“At the highest level of generalization, the physician has two
obligations. The first is to possess the requisite learning and skill, and the second is to
exercise the requisite care and diligence in using that learning and skill.”).
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The standard of care for health care providers has traditionally been
determined by what members of their profession would customarily do,
rather than the reasonable and prudent person standard generally applied
in negligence cases.47 More specifically, they are under a legal duty to
render their services “in a manner comporting with the skill and technical
proficiency normally exercised by other professionals in the same field.”48
Thus, the members of a given profession essentially set the standard of
care.49 Courts’ deference to these standards means that cases revolve
around expert witness testimony “describing the actual pattern of . . .
practice [within the profession], without any reference to the effectiveness
of that practice.”50 This approach means health care providers tend to be
subject to liability only if they provide care that is out of step with what
members of their profession are currently delivering, even if the
customary approach could be expected to result in a poor outcome for a
given client.51
However, there are indications that this manner of establishing the
standard of care may be eroding. “In more than half the states, either
through an explicit statutory change or through case law, malpractice
law has moved away from a customary-practice standard, and toward a
reasonably-prudent-physician standard.”52 This approach undercuts a
47. See, e.g., Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86, 92 (Kan. 1983) (quoting Malone v.
Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 552 P.2d 885, 888–89 (Kan. 1976); Chandler v. Neosho Mem’l
Hosp., 574 P.2d 136, 138 (Kan. 1977)), overruled on other grounds by Boulanger v. Pol,
900 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1995); Stepakoff v. Kantar, 473 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Mass. 1985)
(citing Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968)); Wofford v. E. State Hosp., 795
P.2d 516, 520 (Okla. 1990). But see infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
48. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 125 (4th ed. 2004).
49. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 270.
50. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 144
(4th ed. 2001).
51. See Lindsay v. N. Va. Mental Health Inst., 736 F. Supp. 1392, 1396 (E.D. Va.
1990) (determining a psychiatrist who followed established safety protocols was not
liable for the death of an escaped patient). But see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 985
(Wash. 1974) (en banc) (finding that adherence to customary practice is not a shield if a
relatively cost-effective alternative that enhances patient well-being is available); infra notes
52–54 and accompanying text.
52. James Knoll & Joan Gerbasi, Psychiatric Malpractice Case Analysis: Striving
for Objectivity, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 215, 216 (2006); see also John Tucker,
Comment, A Novel Approach To Determining Best Medical Practices: Looking at the
Evidence, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 147, 179 (2010) (“[O]ver the past half century
there has been a subtle erosion of the complete deference afforded the medical community in
defining the medical standard of care.”); id. at 184–85 (reporting that “17 states have
produced appellate decisions ‘explicitly rejecting the view that mere conformity to the
usual custom and practice constitutes conclusive evidence’” that the standard of care was
met and indicating a growing role for guidelines reflecting best practices supported by
empirical evidence (quoting Ben A. Rich, Medical Custom and Medical Ethics: Rethinking
the Standard of Care, 14 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 27, 32 (2005))).
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“safety-in-numbers” approach that encouraged the status quo, and it has
coincided with the rise of “evidence-based medicine,”53 with testifying
experts referring to such evidence when articulating the standard of
care.54 To the extent mental health providers can cite empirical support
for the steps they have taken, they are far more likely to be shielded
from liability. At the same time, an evidence-based approach may
increasingly be viewed as necessary to satisfy the standard of care.55

53. See David M. Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine: A Unified Approach, 24 HEALTH
AFF. 9, 9 (2005) (“The term ‘evidence-based medicine’ . . . has spread through medicine
with amazing speed during the past fifteen years. The pace speaks to the attraction and
fundamental soundness of the core idea: that what happens to patients should be based,
to the greatest extent possible, on evidence.”); Rachel A. Lindor, Advancing EvidenceBased Medicine by Expanding Coverage with Evidence Development, 52 JURIMETRICS J.
209, 209 (2012) (arguing that Medicare’s “coverage with evidence development” policy
that bases Medicare coverage for new products on evidence of effectiveness will make
healthcare reform more successful); Jon-David R Schwalm & Salim Yusuf, Commentary,
‘The End of Clinical Freedom’: Relevance in the Era of Evidence-Based Medicine, 40
INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 855, 856 (2011); Tucker, supra note 52, at 149 (“As evidence
based practice becomes the standard in the medical profession, the judiciary and state
and federal legislators will fulfill their role and adapt the law to meet the requirements of
changed circumstances.”); id. at 180 (“[I]t is likely that [advances in the medical evidence
base] will permeate medical malpractice litigation in the same way they are permeating
medical practice.”); Alex Stark, From the Editor: Catching Up with Evidence-Based
Medicine, VIRTUAL MENTOR (Jan. 2011), http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2011/01/fred11101.html.
54. See Tucker, supra note 52, at 188 (“In a classic battle of the experts, the one
relying on high quality empirical data would be at an advantage in establishing her
position as the true standard of care. As more jurisdictions adopt the position that
customary care is not dispositive of the standard of care, and that reasonable prudence in
reviewing and utilizing evolving [medical] evidence is a necessary factor in determining
whether the standard was met, the reliance of testifying medical experts on [sources of
information that reflect this evidence] will only increase.”).
55. See Peter A. Briss et al., Closing the Gap Between Science and Law, 35 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 92, 95 (Supp. 2007) (noting that in Washington State legislation was
enacted directing mental health services to include evidence-based practices, and state
contracts now require providers to use such practices); Mary C. Ruffolo & Jeff Capobianco,
Moving an Evidence-Based Intervention into Routine Mental Health Care: A Multifaceted
Case Example, 51 SOC. WORK HEALTH CARE 77, 77 (2012) (“[T]he movement to bring
evidence-based mental health interventions into the public mental health system . . . has
been a major thrust of federal and state efforts over the past 10 years.”); Gregory A.
Aarons et al., The Organizational Social Context of Mental Health Services and Clinician
Attitudes Toward Evidence-Based Practice: A United States National Study, IMPLEMENTATION
SCI. 56 (June 22, 2012), http://www.implementationscience.com/content/7/1/56 (“Clinicians
who work in [mental health] clinics that expect them to place the well-being of each
client first, to be competent and to have up-to-date knowledge are more likely to have
more favorable views toward using [evidence-based practices] . . . .”).
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Nonetheless, courts continue to differentiate between care that falls
below the professional standard and “a mere error of judgment.”56 It has
been determined that
[m]edical malpractice is legal fault by a physician or surgeon. It arises from
the failure of a physician to provide the quality of care required by law. . . .
A competent physician is not liable per se for a mere error of judgment, mistaken
diagnosis or the occurrence of an undesirable result.57

This deference to professional judgment has long existed, dating back at
least to an 1898 decision by the high court of New York,58 and has been
specifically applied to mental health care.59 Thus, the defining question
in these cases is often whether the mental health provider, practicing in a
field rife with uncertainty60 but in which substantial empirical progress is
being made,61 made an error that should incur liability.62
Another defense in many jurisdictions is the “respectable minority
doctrine.”63 This doctrine has been explained as:

56. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 866 (Miss. 1985). But see Joseph H.
King, Jr., Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective Standard of Care in
Medical Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 49, 62 (1999) (explaining that the “error of judgment”
rule has been expressly recognized by only a minority of jurisdictions and many have
stated that “only non-negligent judgments should be protected from liability”).
57. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 866 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
58. Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (N.Y. 1898) (“The rule . . . does not hold
[a physician] liable for a mere error of judgment, provided he does what he thinks is best after
careful examination.”).
59. See, e.g., Soutear v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 524, 536 (E.D. Mich. 1986)
(“‘Psychiatry . . . is not an exact science. Medical doctors cannot predict with perfect
accuracy whether or not an individual will do violence to himself or to someone else. . . .
The concept of “due care” in appraising psychiatric problems, assuming proper procedures
are followed, must take account of the difficulty often inevitable in definitive diagnosis.’
Thus, a psychiatrist will not be held liable for his patient’s violent behavior simply because he
failed to predict it accurately.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. Lhim, 335
N.W.2d 481, 487–88 (1983))); Schrempf v. State, 487 N.E.2d 883, 888–89 (N.Y. 1985)
(“The treating physician . . . simply attached greater significance to those factors which
seemed most promising and chose the course which appeared to offer the best opportunity for
long-term rehabilitation. We know with hindsight that it was a mistaken impression. However,
under the circumstances, it must be recognized as an exercise of professional judgment
for which [liability will not be assigned].”); Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health
Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ohio 1988).
60. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
62. It has also been noted that
[e]ach physician [is] expected to possess or have reasonable access to such medical
knowledge as is commonly possessed or reasonably available to minimally
competent physicians in the same specialty or general field of practice . . . , to
have a realistic understanding of the limitations on his or her knowledge or
competence, and, in general, to exercise minimally adequate medical judgment.
Hall, 466 So. 2d at 871.
63. See, e.g., Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992) (“[A] physician
will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a course of
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Where two or more schools of thought exist among competent members of the
medical profession concerning proper medical treatment for a given ailment, each
of which is supported by responsible medical authority, it is not malpractice to
be among the minority . . . who follow one of the accepted schools.64

One criticism of this doctrine is that it allows practitioners to provide
care that is not proven or even widely believed to be the most effective.65
This tension is particularly evident in mental health care, where studies
of the efficacy of various treatment alternatives are often lacking or highly
contentious,66 but it also frequently comes into play when traditional
treatments are called into question by emerging approaches.
For example, in one case a patient underwent seven months of
psychoanalysis for depression at a private facility without psychotropic
medications being administered.67 After his depression continued to
worsen, he ultimately left the facility and was successfully treated at
another facility with the aid of such medication.68 The patient sued the
first facility, alleging that it was malpractice to not provide the most
widely employed means of caring for someone with his condition—
pharmacotherapy.69 This facility, however, was one of the leading
psychoanalysis-oriented treatment centers in the country, and practitioners
there tended to eschew the administration of psychotropic medications
treatment advocated by a considerable number of recognized and respected professionals
in his given area of expertise.”).
64. Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974).
65. See Glenn E. Bradford & David G. Meyers, The Legal and Regulatory Climate
in the State of Missouri for Complementary and Alternative Medicine—Honest Disagreement
Among Competent Physicians or Medical McCarthyism?, 70 UMKC L. REV. 55, 79 (2001)
(citing Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 163–65 (Tex. 1977)).
66. See Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (addressing
difficulty of correctly diagnosing psychiatric problems); Larry E. Beutler, David and Goliath:
When Empirical and Clinical Standards of Practice Meet, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 997,
999 (2000) (discussing contention over various treatment methods); Sarah Baldauf, Brain
Stimulation: Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, USNEWS.COM (July 15, 2009), http://health.
usnews.com/health-news/family-health/brain-and-behavior/articles/2009/07/15/brainstimulation-transcranial-magnetic-stimulation (describing research into new form of brain
stimulation used to treat depression).
67. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 141 (5th ed. 2009) (citing John G. Malcolm, Treatment Choices
and Informed Consent in Psychiatry: Implications of the Osheroff Case for the Profession, 14
J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 9, 16–18 (1986)) (discussing Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, Inc.,
490 A.2d 720 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)).
68. Id. at 142.
69. Id. at 140 (citing Gerald L. Klerman, The Psychiatric Patient’s Right to Effective
Treatment: Implications of Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 409, 410
(1990)).
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based on a belief that their use precluded exploration and resolution of
underlying psychological problems.70 This case demonstrates that the
doctrinal orientation of a mental health practitioner can make a significant
difference in the diagnosis and treatment techniques employed, but if
that orientation falls out of style or is deemed inappropriate to address a
client’s condition, its practitioners may be subject to liability.71 As
medications have become more widely used to treat mental disorders,72
some believe the standard of care may soon routinely require this type of
treatment.73 This controversial view,74 if accepted, would enhance the
risk of liability for practitioners who primarily use traditional, psychoanalytic
methods of treatment or other nonpharmaceutical approaches.75 However,
it also suggests physicians may face liability for failing to refer to a
nonmedical mental health practitioner a patient who might be better served
by receiving a treatment modality that is not focused on pharmaceutical
agents.76
Nevertheless, although medical malpractice claims in general are
relatively widespread,77 this has not been the case with regard to mental
health professional liability claims.78 As one commentator wrote in 1991
about the traditionally low rate of mental health malpractice claims:

70. Id. at 141.
71. See id. at 140 (quoting Klerman, supra note 69, at 410–11) (noting that
an arbitration panel ultimately awarded the patient $250,000, which was upheld by a
Maryland Special Appeals Court).
72. See infra Part V.
73. See Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the ‘Chemical Straitjacket’: The Legal
Significance of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1093 (2002).
74. Controversy continues over whether forms of treatment other than psychotropic
medications provide an equal or better alternative, whether these medications are safe
and effective, and whether they are employed primarily because they are cheaper and
enable third-party payors to avoid paying for long-term treatment. See Gardiner Harris,
Proof Is Scant on Psychiatric Drug Mix for Young, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2006, at A1;
Jennifer Colangelo, The Right To Refuse Treatment for Mental Illness, 5 RUTGERS J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y (Spring 2008), http://www.rutgerspolicyjournal.org/sites/rutgerspolicyjournal.
org/files/issues/5_3/JLPP_5-3.pdf; infra Parts V–VII.
75. See infra Part V. One reading of the settlement discussed supra note 71 is that
a practitioner may be liable for failing to refer a client to a provider who can prescribe
psychopharmacological treatment, a reading that would have a very significant impact on
the delivery of mental health care as nonphysicians—such as clinical psychologists—
currently treat large numbers of individuals with a mental illness. See Phillip S. Wang et
al., Twelve-Month Use of Mental Health Services in the United States, 62 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 629, 630–31 (2005) (explaining that over thirty percent of all individuals
seeking treatment for mental illness employ nonphysicians).
76. See infra Part V; see also supra note 74, infra notes 145, 165, 190, 196 and
accompanying text.
77. Jena et al., supra note 30, at 629.
78. See id.; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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[D]uty, causation, and injury . . . are often difficult to prove; technical legal doctrines
sometimes interfere with potential claims; former patients are reluctant to expose
their mental health problems to the public . . . ; and the close relationship between
patients and mental health professionals makes patients reluctant to file claims.79

Proving these claims is still a daunting task today. Establishing the
standard of care is challenging because of a lack of consensus regarding
the diagnoses of mental disorders and the appropriate course of treatment
for a given diagnosis, the absence of physical symptoms to guide these
decisions, and the difficulty of predicting and preventing the exceptional
behaviors—such as suicide or violence—that are often the critical event
for a related claim.80 Furthermore, the standard of care is typically
established via expert witness testimony,81 but the ability of even forensic
mental health professionals to approach liability cases competently and
objectively has been questioned.82 Similarly, establishing causation is
complicated by the fact that plaintiffs often have a history of mental
illness before beginning treatment, clouding the already convoluted issue of
proving that harm was caused by inadequate treatment.83 There also
must be a showing of damages before these claims can survive, with
psychological or emotional harm frequently their primary focus,84 but

79. Smith, supra note 8, at 213–14.
80. See id. at 214. But see Knoll & Gerbasi, supra note 52, at 216 (“[T]he applicable
standard in [psychiatric] medical malpractice cases appears to be in the process of
shifting and developing.” (citing Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Reasonable Physician Standard:
The New Malpractice Standard of Care?, 34 J. HEALTH L. 105 (2001))); Maggie Murray,
Note, Determining a Psychiatrist’s Liability When a Patient Commits Suicide: Haar v.
Ulwelling, 39 N.M. L. REV. 641, 641 (2009) (“[F]ailure to prevent suicide is one of the
leading causes for malpractice suits against mental health care providers.”).
81. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
82. See Knoll & Gerbasi, supra note 52, at 216 (“Even among forensic psychiatrists,
there may be considerable confusion about what standard of care to use when analyzing
a psychiatric malpractice case.”).
83. See Smith, supra note 8, at 214–15; see also Knoll & Gerbasi, supra note 52,
at 218 (“In cases of psychiatric malpractice, causation is perhaps the legal issue of greatest
consequence.”); id. at 219 (“Two important concepts may support a defendant’s claim
that her acts or omissions were not the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s damages: the
presence of an intervening cause and the lack of foreseeability. Both . . . are elusive and
complicated concepts.”).
84. For cases where such damages have been recognized, see Accardo v. Cenac,
722 So. 2d 302, 304, 312 (La. Ct. App. 1998), involving neurological conditions resulting
from medication, Noto v. St. Vincent’s Hospital & Medical Center, 559 N.Y.S.2d 510,
511 (App. Div. 1990), involving aggravation of existing psychological debilities, and
Bramlette v. Charter-Medicine-Columbia, 393 S.E.2d 914, 915–16 (S.C. 1990), involving
suicide.
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historically such harm has not been a sufficient basis for recovery.85
Also, it is generally difficult for jurors and judges to understand and
assess the impact of such harm in assigning damages.86 Nevertheless, as
follows, there are many reasons to expect the number of these cases to
increase.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE DECREASE IN STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS
In the past, recipients of mental health services were reluctant to file
claims against treatment providers in part because doing so required
them to discuss their condition publicly and expose themselves to the stigma
routinely associated with mental illness.87 Indeed, after professional
liability insurance was first made available to psychologists by the
American Psychological Association (APA) in 1961, zero claims were
paid out for a decade.88 Perhaps reflecting the growing understanding and
acceptance of mental illness, clients have become more willing to pursue
such claims as time has gone on,89 with insurance payments rising
accordingly.90
Stigmatization of individuals with a mental illness has a lengthy
history and has only recently begun to abate.91 “[This] [s]tigma . . . affects
every aspect of their lives. It brings with it a multitude of problems,
from insurance, to housing, to jobs; stigma stops patients from getting

85. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
86. See Smith, supra note 8, at 215 (comparing emotional injuries to the sight of
“[a] mangled limb or scarred body” in a traditional medical malpractice suit, which “presents
to a jury dramatic evidence of injury” (quoting STEVEN R. SMITH & ROBERT G. MEYER,
LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND MENTAL HEALTH: POLICY AND PRACTICE 9 (1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
87. Id. at 213.
88. Id. at 212.
89. Id. at 212–13.
90. Id. at 212 (explaining that by 1980, the APA Insurance Trust paid over $400,000 in
claims in a four-year period (citing Paul Frederic Slawson & Frederick G. Guggenheim,
Psychiatric Malpractice: A Review of the National Loss Experience, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
979, 980 (1984))); see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO & STEVEN R. SMITH, MALPRACTICE IN
PSYCHOLOGY: A PRACTICAL RESOURCE FOR CLINICIANS 6 (2011) (explaining that APA
payments reached $750,000 for fiscal year 2005 (citing personal communication with Gerald
Koocher in July 2009)).
91. William R. Dubin & Paul Jay Fink, Effects of Stigma on Psychiatric Treatment, in
STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 1 (Paul Jay Fink & Allan Tasman eds., 1992) (“Mental
illness was once thought to be related to being possessed with demons. In more recent
times, while such concepts are no longer prevalent, patients with mental illness continue
to be viewed as constitutionally weak, dangerous, and responsible for their own plight.”).
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the best treatment, or at times from getting any treatment at all.”92 Such
stigmatized individuals were poorly positioned to initiate claims when
they received questionable care.93 However, in recent years there has
been a concerted effort by many community leaders, consumer advocates,
and mental health professionals to educate the public about mental
illness and to free these individuals from blame for their condition.94
Attempting to reverse the segregation induced by the extensive use of
institutional care, and with a goal of treating individuals with a mental
illness more humanely, legislation to establish community-based treatment
centers and group homes has been enacted.95 As a result, the idea that
such individuals were a “menace” and “should be locked up and segregated
from the rest of the community” began to recede.96
Of particular note, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was
passed in 1990 with the purpose of proscribing discrimination based on
disability and “to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for . . . individuals
[with disabilities].”97 In 1999, the United States Supreme Court made it

92. Id.; see also GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE
OF AMERICA’S MENTALLY ILL 6 (1994) (discussing obstacles facing the mentally ill during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
93. Smith, supra note 8, at 213–14.
94. See, e.g., RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, REPORT OF
THE RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL: CHARTERING THE SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL RETURN OF
PRISONERS TO THE COMMUNITY 455 (2005), available at http://www.reentrypolicy.org/jc
_publications/rpc_report_full/RPC_Report_Full.pdf (“[Recommendation] F: Educate the
public to destigmatize mental illness and build support for people with mental illnesses.”);
Glenna Riley, Note, The Pursuit of Integrated Living: The Fair Housing Act as a Sword
for Mentally Disabled Adults Residing in Group Homes, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
177, 178–79 (2011); John Dolores, Psychotherapy: Not Just for Chronic Mental Illness,
WYO. LAW., June 2011, at 60; NAMI Public Service Announcements, NAT’L ALLIANCE
ON MENTAL ILLNESS (July 2007), http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=About_NAMI
&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=42493.
95. See Samantha A. DiPolito, Comment, Olmstead v. L.C.—Deinstitutionalization
and Community Integration: An Awakening of the Nation’s Conscience?, 58 MERCER L.
REV. 1381, 1385 (2007) (discussing the civil rights era and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which is called the “key legislative impetus behind” deinstitutionalization).
96. Id. at 1384–85; see also Shirley L. Klett et al., Patient Evaluation of the Psychiatric
Ward, 19 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 347, 351 (1963) (reporting results of a patient survey
regarding perceptions of state hospital psychiatric wards).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. IV 2011); see also Aviv Shamash, Note,
A Piecemeal, Step-by-Step Approach Toward Mental Health Parity, 7 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 273, 280–82 (2011) (describing the passage of the Mental Health Parity
Act of 1996, which limited differential treatment of mental health care costs by insurers).

45

clear in Olmstead v. L.C.98 that “the unjustified segregation of individuals
with mental disabilities in institutions constitutes discrimination under
the ADA.”99 Also in 1999, Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon
General was released, which encourages individuals with a mental illness to
seek help, pointing to the many evidence-based interventions now
available and stating that “[t]he health of the American people demands
that we act with resolve and a sense of urgency to . . . address through
research and education . . . the stigma attached to mental illness.”100
Additionally, in 2008 Congress passed the Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act (MHPAE),101 which “broadly prohibits group health
plans from imposing disparate financial or coverage restrictions on
mental health care.”102 Although the MHPAE does not mandate that
insurers provide coverage for mental health care services,103 most states
enacted parity statutes that require “more significant mental health coverage
than their federal counterpart.”104 Subsequently, Congress enacted the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA),105 which
“require[s] most insurance plans to offer essential health benefits, which
include mental health, substance abuse, and behavioral health services.”106
Community and online resources and support groups are also
increasingly available to help individuals suffering from mental illness

98.
99.
100.

Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Dipolito, supra note 95, at 1392 (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607).
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
S URGEON G ENERAL 453–54 (1999), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/
NNBBHS.pdf (“Stigma assumes many forms, both subtle and overt. It appears as prejudice
and discrimination, fear, distrust, and stereotyping. It prompts many people to avoid working,
socializing, and living with people who have a mental disorder. Stigma impedes people
from seeking help for fear that the confidentiality of their diagnosis or treatment will be
breached. It gives insurers—in the public sector as well as the private—tacit permission
to restrict coverage for mental health services in ways that would not be tolerated for other
illnesses. . . . Powerful and pervasive, stigma prevents people from acknowledging their
own mental health problems, much less disclosing them to others.”).
101. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 112 Stat. 3765 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a
(Supp. II 2009)).
102. See Shamash, supra note 97, at 284 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(3)(A)).
103. Id. at 286.
104. Id. at 287.
105. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
106. Shamash, supra note 97, at 296 (citing PPACA § 1302(b)(1)). The PPACA is
more expansive in scope than the MHPAE in part because it is not limited to the large group
health plans covered by the MHPAE. For a discussion of the PPACA relative to the
MHPAE and its impact on the delivery of mental health care, see Colleen L. Barry & Haiden
A. Huskamp, Moving Beyond Parity—Mental Health and Addiction Care Under the
ACA, 365 N EW E NG . J. M ED . 973 (2011), and Stacey A. Tovino, A Proposal for
Comprehensive and Specific Essential Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits,
38 AM. J.L. & MED. 471 (2012).
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obtain better services.107 Direct-to-consumer advertising, including ads
for antidepressants and antianxiety medications, are thought by some to
be further reducing the stigma associated with mental illness by increasing
awareness of these conditions and enhancing their “medicalization,”108
thereby replacing the public perception that these are deviant social
behaviors with a view that they are treatable medical conditions.109
Although commentators have expressed concerns that these promotional
efforts will result in the overdiagnosis of mental illness or a failure to
employ equally effective alternative treatment modalities with fewer side
effects,110 such information may encourage individuals to have meaningful
conversations with their health care providers about their conditions and
to scrutinize more closely related treatment decisions.111
Although there is no denying that individuals affected by mental
illness continue to face stigma,112 efforts to dispel related myths, reduce
discrimination, and educate citizens about the nature of mental illness
and effective treatment options have lessened associated taboos.113 This
107. See, e.g., NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org/ (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013) (providing informational resources, a legislative action center, and
online communities for discussion and mutual support).
108. Andrew R. Payton & Peggy A. Thoits, Medicalization, Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising, and Mental Illness Stigma, 1 SOC’Y & MENTAL HEALTH 55, 55 (2011)
(“Medicalization occurs . . . when previously non-medical problems are defined and treated as
medical problems . . . .” (quoting Peter Conrad & Valerie Leiter, From Lydia Pinkham to
Queen Levitra: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Medicalisation, 30 SOC. HEALTH &
ILLNESS 825, 825 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. Id. at 56.
110. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts:
Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty To Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491,
502–03 (2009); see also Katie Thomas, J.&J. Unit Settles Cases with States on Risperdal,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012, at B3 (“[A]uthorities have said that [Johnson & Johnson’s
subsidiary] promoted the [antipsychotic] drug for uses it did not have approval for, including
dementia in elderly patients, bipolar disorder in children and adolescents, depression and
anxiety.”).
111. See W. John Thomas, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Catalyst
for a Change in the Therapeutic Model in Psychotherapy?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 209, 212
(1999) (quoting Milt Freudenheim, Psychiatric Drugs Are Now Promoted Directly to
Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A1); see also Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra
note 8, at 352–56 (describing proponents’ common arguments in defense of direct-toconsumer advertising).
112. See, e.g., Amanda M. Stone & Lisa J. Merlo, Attitudes of College Students Toward
Mental Illness Stigma and the Misuse of Psychiatric Medications, 72 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
134, 138 (2011).
113. For a discussion of many of the methods being employed to lessen the social
stigma of mental illness, see generally Patrick Corrigan & Betsy Gelb, Three Programs
That Use Mass Approaches To Challenge the Stigma of Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC
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in turn has diminished the threat of public shaming, which previously
discouraged pursuit of professional liability claims.
IV. THE IMPACT OF IMPROVED TREATMENT OUTCOMES
While efforts are being made to reduce the stigma associated with mental
illness, another major shift has been occurring: treatment outcomes are
improving, which is enhancing the functional ability of clients to express
dissatisfaction. Treatment today consists primarily of psychopharmacology,
psychotherapy, or various combinations of the two.114 Whereas past
treatments, including many of the so-called first generation of psychotropic
medications, were often either ineffective or induced debilitating side
effects,115 newer treatments may be more effective and rehabilitative,
albeit not without their own side effects, such as diabetes and rapid
weight gain.116 The availability of improved treatment modalities means

SERVICES 393 (2006), available at http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/data/Journals/PSS/3667/
393.pdf.
114. See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 23; Johnathan Fish, Overcrowding on
the Ship of Fools: Health Care Reform, Psychiatry, and the Uncertain Future of Normality,
11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 181, 183 (2011).
115. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 29; John M. Kane & James M.
Smith, Tardive Dyskinesia: Prevalence and Risk Factors, 1959 to 1979, 39 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 473 (1982) (discussing the risks of developing tardive dyskinesia from
using psychotropic medications); Lobotomy: Surgery for the Insane, 1 STAN. L. REV.
463, 463 (1949) (explaining that a prefrontal lobotomy “can so disintegrate a patient’s
personality as to leave a mere ‘human vegetable’”); Theodore Van Putten et al., Response to
Antipsychotic Medication: The Doctor’s and the Consumer’s View, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
16, 17 (1984) (acknowledging prescribed drugs severely incapacitated patients).
116. See, e.g., K.N.R. Chengappa et al., Clozapine: Its Impact on Aggressive Behavior
Among Patients in a State Psychiatric Hospital, 53 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 1, 5–6 (2002)
(finding clozapine to be effective at treating aggressive and violent behavior); Shitij Kapur et
al., Evidence for Onset of Antipsychotic Effects Within the First 24 Hours of Treatment,
162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 939, 942–45 (2005) (describing early effectiveness of antipsychotic
medicines); Stefan Leucht et al., Antipsychotic Drugs Versus Placebo for Relapse Prevention
in Schizophrenia: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 379 LANCET 2063, 2063 (2012),
available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)60239-6
/fulltext (summarizing data on how antipsychotic drugs benefit schizophrenia patients);
Maura Kelly, Hey, Let’s Not Get Carried Away: Anti-Depressants Really Do Help People,
ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012, 6:57 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/06/heylets-not-get-carried-away-anti-depressants-really-do-help-people/257976/ (defending the
benefits of antidepressants); Robert Preidt, Antipsychotics Do Help Many with Schizophrenia,
Study Finds, HEALTHDAY (May 3, 2012), http://consumer.healthday.com/Article.asp?AID
=664331 (providing overview of multiple studies concluding antipsychotic drugs effectively
treat schizophrenia). But see IRVING KIRSCH, THE EMPEROR’S NEW DRUGS: EXPLODING
THE ANTIDEPRESSANT MYTH (2010) (arguing that antidepressant medications do not cure
depression and can be harmful); ROBERT WHITAKER, ANATOMY OF AN EPIDEMIC: MAGIC
BULLETS, PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, AND THE ASTONISHING RISE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN AMERICA
(2010) (asserting that psychotropic drugs currently being used cause considerable harm);
Michael B. Knable et al., Extrapyramidal Side Effects with Risperidone and Haloperidol
at Comparable D2 Receptor Occupancy Levels, 75 PSYCHIATRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING
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clients dissatisfied with their treatment, perhaps after a change in
treatment or therapist, may now be better able to assert their rights and
sustain litigation.
As noted, historically, few if any effective treatments were available
for responding to mental illness.117 Following the revelation that lithium
could be used as a treatment for bipolar affective disorders in 1949, the
development of psychotropic medications accelerated dramatically.118 In
the following decade, numerous antidepressant and antipsychotic drugs
transformed the treatment of mental disorders in the United States.119
This made it possible to decrease the number of individuals living in
state psychiatric facilities and return them to the community.120 It has
been said that the chance discovery of chlorpromazine’s ability to
reduce psychotic symptoms “ushered in the era of modern
psychopharmacology,”121 although it would later be discovered that
these first generation antipsychotics (FGAs) were also associated with a
wide range of debilitating and even fatal side effects.122
91, 98 (1997) (concluding that risperidone does not appear to prevent psychotic symptoms);
Erica Goode, 3 Schizophrenia Drugs May Raise Diabetes Risk, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2003, at A8 (describing how three commonly prescribed antipsychotic medicines
increase patients’ risk of developing diabetes); Denise Mann, Older Antipsychotics May
Work as Well as Newer Ones: Review; First-Generation Medications Are Also Much
Cheaper, Researchers Note, HEALTHDAY (Aug. 14, 2012), http://consumer.healthday.com/
Article.asp?AID=667642 (providing results of study concluding that second-generation
antipsychotics are not significantly more effective than first-generation antipsychotics);
Brian Vastag, Hidden Data Show that Antipsychotic Drugs Are Less Effective than
Advertised, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2012, 6:05 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
the-checkup/post/hidden-data-show-that-antipsychotic-drugs-are-less-effective-than-advertised/
2012/03/20/gIQAXX4IQS_blog.html (summarizing research on limited effectiveness of
modern antipsychotic drugs); infra note 143 and accompanying text.
117. See Shamash, supra note 97, at 273 (“Even after the focus turned from
incarceration to treatment, for centuries, many of the methods—including therapeutic
asylums, electroshock therapy, and lobotomies—were at best ineffective and at worst
inhumane.”); supra notes 3–5, 115 and accompanying text.
118. SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 23; Joseph F. Goldberg & Leslie Citrome,
Latest Therapies for Bipolar Disorder: Looking Beyond Lithium, POSTGRAD MED., Feb.
2005, at 25, 25–26.
119. SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 23.
120. Id. Other factors also contributed to this decrease, including a difficult fiscal
climate for states that led them to reduce the availability of these beds as a cost-savings
measure. See APPELBAUM, supra note 2, at 50.
121. Gerald J. Schaefer, Drug-Induced Alteration of Psychotic Behavior: Who Benefits?,
9 J.L. & HEALTH 43, 44 (1994–1995).
122. See Douglas Mossman & Jill L. Steinberg, Promoting, Prescribing, and Pushing
Pills: Understanding the Lessons of Antipsychotic Drug Litigation, 13 MICH. ST. U. J.
MED. & L. 263, 278–79 (2009) (explaining that “extrapyramidal symptoms” experienced
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Antianxiety medications emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, and during
the late 1980s and 1990s pharmaceuticals known as selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) were developed to address depression.123 In
1989, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved clozapine, the
first so-called second generation antipsychotic (SGA), or “atypical”
antipsychotic, a class of drugs purported to “alleviate psychotic symptoms
without inducing the extrapyramidal side effects” common with FGA
use and with a much lower occurrence of damaging neuromotor syndromes
such as tardive dyskinesia. 124 Over time, SGAs have become the
predominant choice of physicians treating psychoses, although doubts as
to their superiority and effectiveness and greater recognition of their own
debilitating side effects have emerged.125
As a result of the development of these medications and a considerable
broadening in the scope of their usage, the number of related prescriptions
has grown dramatically in recent years.126 While spending on
antidepressants more than doubled between 1997 and 2004, the sharpest
increase was for drugs used to manage schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
and other psychoses, with spending on such drugs increasing from $1.3
billion to $4.1 billion during this period.127 It was recently reported that
“one in five adults [are] now taking at least one psychiatric drug . . . [and
the o]verall use of psychiatric medications among adults grew 22%
from 2001 to 2010.”128 Although the increased use of medication

by patients taking FGAs included “stiffness, diminished facial expression, tremors, and
restlessness[,] . . . permanent and sometimes disabling neuromotor syndromes such as tardive
dyskinesia (TD), and . . . neuroleptic malignant syndrome, a severe and sometimes fatal
reaction to the drugs” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
123. SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 23.
124. Mossman & Steinberg, supra note 122, at 279–80.
125. See KIRSCH, supra note 116; WHITAKER, supra note 116; Knable et al., supra
note 116, at 98; Mossman & Steinberg, supra note 122, at 284–93; Goode, supra note 116;
Mann, supra note 116; Vastag, supra note 116.
126. See Shirley S. Wang, Psychiatric Drug Use Spreads: Pharmacy Data Show a Big
Rise in Antipsychotic and Adult ADHD Treatments, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2011, at A3;
Sandra G. Boodman, Antipsychotic Drugs Grow More Popular for Patients Without Mental
Illness, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
antipsychotic-drugs-grow-more-popular-for-patients-without-mental-illness/2012/02/02/gI
QAH1yz7R_story.html; Rick Nauert, Cost/Use of Psych Meds Explode, PSYCH CENT.
(Apr. 25, 2007), http://psychcentral.com/news/2007/04/25/spending-on-psychotherapeuticdrugs-explode; Vastag, supra note 116.
127. Nauert, supra note 126.
128. Wang, supra note 126 (“In 2010, Americans spent $16.1 billion on antipsychotics
to treat depression, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, $11.6 billion on antidepressants and
$7.2 billion on treatment for ADHD . . . .”); see also ERWIN BROWN, JR., MED. EXPENDITURE
PANEL SURVEY, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, STATISTICAL BRIEF
319: HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES FOR ADULTS AGES 18–64 WITH A MENTAL HEALTH OR
SUBSTANCE ABUSE RELATED EXPENSE: 2007 VERSUS 1997 (2011), available at http://meps.
ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/st319/stat319.pdf (explaining that total mental health or
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can be explained in part by scientific developments identifying new
compounds and additional uses for existing medications, it can also be
attributed to their expansive, albeit often unsubstantiated, use to treat a
range of disorders129 and the fact that many insurance companies will
reimburse for the full cost of treatment that relies on medication but only
part of the costs associated with psychotherapy.130
While medications to treat the biological underpinnings of mental
illness became increasingly available and popular, nonbiological treatments,
which typically utilize verbal rather than physical interventions, also
emerged and evolved.131 During World War II, psychiatrists found
psychoanalysis to be an effective means of achieving relief for battleworn soldiers and “implemented their new passion with zeal in post-war
America.”132 Psychoanalysis was subsequently applied to help the average
person overcome “problems of everyday life.”133 In 1952, the first edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was
published,134 with a diagnostic scheme “built upon the theoretical
framework of Freudian psychoanalysis.”135 Moreover, other schools of
psychotherapy were also emerging during this time with their practitioners
bringing to bear their own expertise.136 For example, “[t]he large-scale
employment of clinical and counseling psychologists by the Veterans
Administration during the World War II era is widely accepted as

substance abuse treatment expenditures for adults between the ages of 18 and 64 were $36.5
billion in 2007, up $13 billion from 1997).
129. See Mark Olfson et al., National Trends in the Office-Based Treatment of Children,
Adolescents, and Adults with Antipsychotics, 69 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1247, 1252
(2012) (“Most of the . . . adult antipsychotic visits [to an office-based practice] did not
include a diagnosis for which the antipsychotic had FDA approval . . . . The strength of
evidence supporting efficacy for these ‘off-label’ conditions varies considerably . . . .”).
130. See Boodman, supra note 126; Ellen Joan Pollock, Managed Care’s Focus on
Psychiatric Drugs Alarms Many Doctors: They Say Effort To Cut Costs Leads to Overuse,
Misuse of Pills for Mental Illness; Talk Therapy Is Discouraged, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1995, at
A1.
131. See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 32–42.
132. Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive Behavior and
Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 93–94 (2008).
133. Id. at 93.
134. Id. at 96 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL:
MENTAL DISORDERS (1st ed. 1952)).
135. Id.
136. For an overview of the emergence of various schools of thought relating to
psychotherapy, see Laurel Furumoto, The New History of Psychology, in 9 THE G. STANLEY
HALL LECTURE SERIES 9, 11–12 (Ira S. Cohen ed., 1989).
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providing a significant impetus to the emergence of psychologists as
practitioners . . . .”137
The 1999 Surgeon General’s report on mental health divided
psychotherapy into three major categories: psychodynamic, behavioral,
and humanistic,138 while a contemporary estimate puts the number of
related schools of thought at around 250.139 The “school of thought” to
which mental health providers belong can have considerable significance
in a professional liability suit, as their actions will typically be judged
against what a reasonable practitioner of that school of thought would
have done under similar circumstances.140 However, different orientations
have grown and faded in popularity over the years, with some discredited
and associated professionals found liable when their clients experienced
harm.141 For example, “conversion therapy,” a school of thought that
had a significant number of adherents at one time, subsequently fell out
of favor, and its practitioners became the target of numerous professional
liability claims.142

137. Introduction to PSYCHOLOGY AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE: THE INTERFACE OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW, at x, xi (Francis R.J. Fields & Rudy J. Horwitz eds., 1982)
(internal citation omitted); see also SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 53 (describing clinical
psychology as a dominant force since 1950).
138. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 100, at 65–67.
139. SHAPIRO & SMITH, supra note 90, at 26–27.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Jonathan Sacks, New Development, “Pray Away the Gay?”: An Analysis
of the Legality of Conversion Therapy by Homophobic Religious Organizations, 13 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIGION 67, 72–78 (2011).
142. Id. Therapists employing “conversion therapy” attempted to “re-orient” someone
with a homosexual orientation to a heterosexual preference. Id. at 67–68. Treatment
centers were typically supported by organized religions opposed to homosexuality under
the belief that it is morally wrong. Id. at 72 (“[A]ntigay views are ‘frequently rooted in
sacred texts and codes of sexual conduct derived from those texts.’” (quoting John C.
Green, Antigay: Varieties of Opposition to Gay Rights, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS
121, 122 (Craig Rimmerman et al. eds., 2000), available at https://www9.georgetown.
edu/faculty/wilcoxc/green.pdf)). These centers “utilized a variety of treatments . . .
includ[ing] . . . psychoanalytic therapy, prayer and spiritual interventions, electric shock,
nausea-inducing drugs, hormone therapy, surgery, and behavioral treatments, including
masturbatory reconditioning, rest, visits to prostitutes, and excessive bicycle riding.” Id.
at 70 (citing Douglas C. Haldeman, The Practice and Ethics of Sexual Orientation Conversion
Therapy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 221, 221 (1994)). Conversion therapy
is extremely controversial given the fact that, although once considered a mental disorder,
homosexuality has been removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders since 1973 and is increasingly viewed as a legitimate sexual orientation or
behavior. Id. at 72–73 (citing Douglas C. Haldeman, Sexual Orientation Conversion
Therapy for Gay Men and Lesbians: A Scientific Examination, in HOMOSEXUALITY:
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 149, 149 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D.
Weinrich eds., 1991), available at http://drdoughaldeman.com/doc/ScientificExamination.
pdf). Studies have also failed to show that these therapies are safe or effective, with “these
forms of treatment hav[ing] resulted in patients suffering nervous breakdowns, experiencing
feelings of guilt, committing suicide, self-mutilating their genitalia, exhibiting symptoms of
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A raging debate continues over the relative efficacy and appropriateness
of psychotherapy and psychopharmacology for addressing a range of
disorders, with both camps citing research that ostensibly documents the
value of their treatment approach.143 Although some have asserted that
psychotherapy and psychopharmacology should be viewed as alternative
or complementary approaches rather than being seen as antithetical to
one another,144 this ongoing controversy suggests that mental health
practitioners, regardless of their preferred treatment approach, need to
remain aware of and be conversant regarding the potential benefits—and
risks—of alternative treatment courses and refer their clients to other
practitioners when these alternatives better meet their needs.145 At a
minimum, to avoid liability when there are several courses of treatment
available and the most appropriate choice is not clear, mental health
providers should obtain a consultation from someone with expertise

post-traumatic stress disorder, and experiencing other psychological traumas.” Id. at 75
(citing Karolyn Ann Hicks, “Reparative” Therapy: Whether Parental Attempts To Change a
Child’s Sexual Orientation Can Legally Constitute Child Abuse, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 505,
515 & n.42 (1999)). Where clients are subjected to conversion therapy and suffer severe
emotional harm as a result, the providing therapists may be subject to liability. See id. at 78.
143. Compare Marcia Angell, The Epidemic of Mental Illness: Why?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, June 23, 2011, at 20, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2011/jun/23/epidemic-mental-illness-why, and Marcia Angell, The Illusions of Psychiatry,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 14, 2011, at 20, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2011/jul/14/illusions-of-psychiatry/?pagination=false, with Peter D. Kramer, Opinion,
In Defense of Antidepressants, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2011, at SR1. See also KIRSCH,
supra note 116, at 9–10 (finding that drugs and psychotherapy are equally effective at
treating depression); WHITAKER, supra note 116, at 71 (disputing the serotonin theory of
depression); Vastag, supra note 116 (discussing research indicating that SGAs are
minimally effective). For better or for worse, the delivery of mental health treatment in
recent years has parsed into that provided by medically trained professionals, who focus
almost exclusively on the prescription and monitoring of pharmaceutical agents, and
nonmedically trained professionals—such as clinical psychologists—who typically are
not allowed to prescribe pharmaceutical agents and rely instead on psychotherapy and
various cognitive-behavioral interventions. See Jonathan Alpert, Opinion, In Therapy
Forever? Enough Already, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at SR5; Siddhartha Mukherjee,
Post-Prozac Nation: The Science and History of Treating Depression, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Apr. 22, 2012, at 48; infra Part VI.
144. See Ripu D. Jindal & Michael E. Thase, Integrating Psychotherapy and
Pharmacotherapy To Improve Outcomes Among Patients with Mood Disorders, 54
PSYCHIATRIC S ERVICES 1484, 1484 (2003); Sandro Pampallona et al., Combined
Pharmacotherapy and Psychological Treatment for Depression, 61 A RCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 714, 714 (2004).
145. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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regarding these alternatives.146 A failure to obtain a needed referral or
consult when treating a client can constitute a breach of the standard of
care and result in liability for the provider.147 Also, if a practitioner
believes a client needs a treatment other than that approved by the
client’s healthcare payor, there may be a duty to challenge the insurance
company’s coverage refusal.148
V. THE IMPACT OF THE INCREASED USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC
MEDICATIONS
As described, the use of psychotropic medications now has a relatively
lengthy history, and although initially used primarily to treat more
serious conditions where psychotic symptoms were present, they are
now prescribed for a broad range of less serious disorders as well.149
Because of an oftentimes urgent need for a well-directed response, as
well as various associated side effects, mental health providers must
carefully prescribe these medications150 and monitor their use, with
146. See Ryan C.W. Hall & Phillip J. Resnick, Psychotherapy Malpractice: New
Pitfalls, 14 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 119, 121 (2008) (“If there is concern about which course of
action is appropriate, obtain an official consultation from another colleague and/or a
legal representative . . . . This shows deliberation and an attempt to act in good faith.”).
147. See, e.g., Pard v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 518, 526 (D. Or. 1984) (finding
that a psychiatrist avoided liability by acknowledging he was not capable of dealing with
patient’s problems and referring patient to another facility); Klein v. Solomon, 713 A.2d
764, 766 (R.I. 1998) (involving a university psychologist who treated a student with
suicidal tendencies and was found liable when he failed to refer the student to someone
qualified in suicide prevention or someone who could prescribe some form of medication
to reduce his suicidal tendencies); see also Sally Clayton & Bruce Bongar, The Use of
Consultation in Psychological Practice: Ethical, Legal, and Clinical Considerations, 4
ETHICS & BEHAV. 43, 43–44 (1994) (arguing that the importance of consulting in health
care is well documented but psychologists often fail to do so); James M. Ellison, Teaching
Collaboration Between Pharmcotherapist and Psychotherapist, 29 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
195 (2005) (advocating that psychiatric residents be taught collaborative pharmacotherapy);
supra notes 75–76, infra notes 165, 190, 196 and accompanying text.
148. See Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 594 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1995).
149. See Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1247 (finding that from 2005 to 2008
antipsychotics were most commonly prescribed to children for disruptive behavior disorders
and to adults for depression and bipolar disorder); Wang, supra note 126 (discussing
overall increase in antipsychotic prescriptions and growing use for treating attentiondeficit hyperactive disorder); Boodman, supra note 126 (describing shift in prescribing
antipsychotics from primarily targeting schizophrenia and bipolar disorder to treating
anxiety, attention-deficit disorder, and sleep and behavioral problems).
150. The privilege to prescribe medications is generally established as a matter of
state law. Typically only physicians and various other medically trained providers are
granted this privilege—as well as psychologists in New Mexico and Louisiana. See infra
notes 191–201 and accompanying text. However, because medications have come to
play such a significant role in the treatment of mental illness, all mental health providers
must be aware of their impact and take appropriate steps pertaining to their use. See
supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
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modifications promptly made as needed.151 A failure to take appropriate
steps when prescribing or monitoring psychotropic medications can
establish a lack of due care, with recent associated malpractice claims
falling into the following ten basic categories152:
1. Failing to prescribe or continue needed medication or provide
a sufficient level of medication to adequately address a patient’s
condition;153
2. Issuing an unclear or illegible medication order;154
3. Exceeding established recommended dosage without a justifying
clinical indication, particularly when toxic levels were reached
or adverse side effects induced;155
4. Prescribing multiple drugs to a patient—“polypharmacy”—
particularly when adverse interactions among the medications
result;156
5. Prescribing medications that have not been approved by the
FDA;157

151. See Elizabeth Williams, Cause of Action for Negligence or Malpractice of
Psychiatrist, in 13 CAUSES OF ACTION 453, 492 (2d ed. 1999).
152. See Robert I. Simon, The Law and Psychiatry, 1 FOCUS 349, 352 (2003), available
at http://focus.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=49487.
153. See, e.g., Gowan v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (D. Or. 1985)
(holding doctor not liable after discontinuing drug treatment for psychiatric patient); Paddock
v. Chacko, 522 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding failure to prescribe
proper amounts of antipsychotic drugs was not proximate cause of patient’s injuries); Bill
Rankin, State High Court Lets Malpractice Suit Go Forward in Killing, ATLANTA J.CONST., Sept. 13, 2011, at 2B (“The Georgia Supreme Court is allowing a lawsuit filed
on behalf of a mentally ill man who savagely killed his mother to proceed against the
man’s psychiatrist for discontinuing medications shortly before the homicide.”).
154. See, e.g., Fred Charatan, Compensation Awarded for Death After Illegible
Prescription, 172 W. J. MED. 80, 80 (2000).
155. See, e.g., Moon v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 140, 146 (D. Nev. 1981) (involving
a psychiatrist sued for prescribing prolixin in daily dosages in excess of twenty milligrams
when the recommended dosage is two to ten milligrams per day).
156. See, e.g., Whittle v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 501, 501 (D.D.C. 1987)
(holding that “psychiatric resident’s prescription of dangerous combination of antidepressant
and barbiturates was direct and proximate cause of patient’s death”); Quigley v. Thai,
No. 2:09-CV-14221, 2011 WL 3027809, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2011) (involving
decedent’s estate filing a wrongful death claim after healthy twenty-three-year-old decedent
died following ingestion of two different antidepressants prescribed to him for use in
combination).
157. See Unapproved Drugs: Drugs Marketed in the United States That Do Not
Have Required FDA Approval, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/SelectedEnf
orcementActionsonUnapprovedDrugs/default.htm (last updated Aug. 22, 2012).
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6. Prescribing medication for a use other than that for which
FDA approval was granted—“off-label” usage158—particularly
if an adverse reaction results and adequate justification for the
usage is not supplied,159 notwithstanding that this practice is
common and can be appropriate when treating mental illness;160
7. Failing to adequately disclose the risks associated with a
given medication;161
8. Failing to monitor a patient’s compliance with a prescribed
medication and dosage, which may entail under- or overconsumption of the prescription,162 or failing to properly
wean a patient from a previously prescribed medication;163
158. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE
80 (6th ed. 2008) (“Once a drug is approved for prescribing . . . the FDA does not have the
authority to restrict physicians in their prescribing of the drug for particular purposes. . . .
Prescribing drugs for a different purpose, in a higher or lower dose, or for a different
population (e.g., children) than those for which the FDA approved the medication is
called ‘off-label’ prescribing.”).
159. See Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened
Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 476 (2009)
(“Responsible off-label prescribing requires physicians to: (1) evaluate whether there is
sufficient evidence to justify an off-label use; (2) press for additional information and
research when adequate evidence is lacking; and (3) inform patients about the uncertainties
and potential costs associated with off-label prescribing.”); David C. Radley et al., OffLabel Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021,
1023 (2006) (“The greatest disparity between supported and unsupported off-label
prescription occurred among psychiatric [therapies] (4% strong support vs 96% limited
or no support) . . . .”); Boodman, supra note 126 (“[T]hese days atypical antipsychotics
. . . are being prescribed by psychiatrists and primary-care doctors to treat a panoply of
conditions for which they have not been approved, including anxiety, attention-deficit
disorder, sleep difficulties, behavioral problems in toddlers and dementia.”).
160. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Whittle, 669 F. Supp. at 506 (holding doctor liable when he “fail[ed]
to give [his patient] an explanation of the potential risks and benefits of the proposed
course of treatment”); Nail v. Georgia, 686 S.E.2d 483, 485 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (involving a
state mental health patient who claimed her physician failed to warn her that the drug
Risperdal could cause Parkinson’s disease, which she developed); White v. Lawrence,
975 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tenn. 1998) (holding doctor liable for directing patient’s wife to
covertly administer Disulfiram—commonly known as Antabuse—to an alcoholic patient
when doctor knew it reacted negatively with alcohol); see also infra Part VIII.
162. See, e.g., Speer v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 670, 676 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(holding psychiatrist not liable for failing to monitor patient’s use of medication after
patient killed himself by overdosing on pills); Davisson v. Nicholson, 310 S.W.3d 543,
547 (Tex. App. 2010) (involving an action filed against a psychologist, physician, and
the clinic that employed them alleging they were “negligent by continuing ‘to provide
medical care and treatment’ to [the patient] and ‘by providing continued prescriptions for
Adderall,’ despite collectively having seen [the patient] in the office only two or three
times during that five-year period.”).
163. See, e.g., Stormont-Vail Healthcare, Inc. v. Cutter, 178 P.3d 35, 37–38 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2007) (involving a suit filed against a doctor by a former patient alleging he
breached “his duty of reasonable care by ‘abruptly taking [her] off Paxil, and by failing
to place [her] on the proper taper-phase regimen for Paxil’ . . . , thus endangering her life”).
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9. Failing to monitor the course of treatment and to treat side
effects after they have been identified or should have been
identified;164 and
10. Failing to refer a patient for consultation or treatment by a
specialist or another mental health provider when the needs of
the patient exceed the expertise of the prescribing mental health
provider.165
Recently there has been a concerted effort to reduce psychiatric
polypharmacy.166 Individuals with a mental illness are often prescribed
multiple psychiatric medications, sometimes from the same medication
class—same-class polypharmacy—or sometimes from different medication
classes—multiclass polypharmacy—to treat a given symptom cluster,
usually with little scientific evidence as to the interactive effects of such
combinations.167 Although there are circumstances in which polypharmacy
is an appropriate course of action, prescribers have been urged to “remain
skeptical of polypharmacy approaches until proven,” “[c]onsider treatment
alternatives, such as the use of psychosocial interventions, before
prescribing an additional medication,” and anticipate and monitor for

164. See, e.g., Freeman v. Lebedovych, 186 Fed. App’x 943, 944–45 (11th Cir. 2006)
(involving a prisoner suing psychiatrist, alleging deliberate indifference to prisoner’s
condition after doctor continued prescribing medication that allegedly caused severe side
effects). Because determining the appropriate medication for a given patient continues
to involve a considerable degree of trial and error, modification of a prescription is often
needed as greater understanding of the disorder, which may evolve over time, and the
effectiveness and manifested side effects of the medication prescribed is gained. See
Haiden A. Huskamp, Managing Psychotropic Drug Costs: Will Formularies Work?, 22
HEALTH AFF. 84, 89–90 (2003). In addition, as is generally the case for all medications,
a healthcare provider is typically provided only a range of recommended dosages and
must ascertain over time what is a safe and efficacious dosage level for the patient. But
see Vera v. Beth Israel Med. Hosp., 625 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500–01 (App. Div. 1995) (holding
physician not liable for patient’s attempted suicide after prescribing dosage with limited
information on patient’s health).
165. See supra notes 76, 145–47, infra notes 190, 196 and accompanying text.
166. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., TECHNICAL
REPORT ON PSYCHIATRIC POLYPHARMACY 5–6 (2001), available at http://www.nasmhpd.
org/docs/publications/archiveDocs/2001/Polypharmacy.pdf; see also Steven J. Kingsbury &
Megan Leahy Lotito, Psychiatric Polypharmacy: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Apr. 1, 2007), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/
53816.
167. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., supra note 166,
at 5–7; Kingsbury & Lotito, supra note 166.
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interactions.168 Because of the ever-increasing number of largely
unexplored possible combinations of psychiatric medications169 and the
idiosyncratic responses patients often have to them,170 polypharmacyfocused litigation is particularly likely to continue to expand.
VI. THE EXPANDING ROLE OF PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS AND
PRESCRIBING PRIVILEGES
A key component of the increased use of psychotropic medications is
the enhanced role of primary care physicians in the delivery of mental
health care, particularly with regard to the treatment of anxiety and
depression.171 Primary care physicians play a predominant and expanding
role in today’s health care landscape,172 but this has especially been the
case with regard to mental health care. This role is driven in part by the
unavailability of psychiatrists and other mental health providers in many
parts of the country.173 However, it also reflects the fact that for most
individuals, primary care physicians are the arbiters of their health care
needs.174 Patients’ concerns about their health and health care are usually,
and under most health plans must be, first directed to their primary care
physician, including questions about their mental health and related
treatment options.175 “Primary care providers are the sole contacts for

168. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., supra note 166, at 9,
15–16.
169. Kingsbury & Lotito, supra note 166 (“Given the overwhelming number of possible
combinations, it is unlikely that more than a few of these will be researched.”).
170. Id. (“It should be realized that regardless of the rationale or quality of the
research, the combination chosen might not be effective for a given patient.”).
171. Tami L. Mark et al., Psychotropic Drug Prescriptions by Medical Specialty, 60
P SYCHIATRIC S ERVICES 1167, 1167 (2009) (“[O]f the 472 million prescriptions for
psychotropic medications, 59% were written by general practitioners, 23% by psychiatrists,
and 19% by other physicians and non-physician providers.”); Olfson et al., supra note
129, at 1254 (“The increase [in antipsychotic medications] . . . has been especially concentrated
among . . . those treated by nonpsychiatrist physicians.”).
172. The PPACA seeks to increase the quality of health care services and limit their
costs by expanding the role of primary physicians in delivering health care. See Howard
Dean, The Evolving Role of Physicians in a Reformed American Health Care System, 39
HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 12 (2010).
173. See Kathleen C. Thomas et al., County-Level Estimates of Mental Health
Professional Shortage in the United States, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1323, 1323 (2009)
(detailing the “shortage of mental health professionals” that “has been a persistent concern for
decades” and the “poor distribution of behavioral health professionals across the United
States”).
174. See Barry L. Carter, Pharmacotherapy and the Primary Care Physician, 17
PRIMARY CARE 469, 469 (1990) (explaining that the primary care physician is seen as the
coordinator of health care services for the patient).
175. See Primary Care Providers’ Role in Mental Health, BAZELON CENTER FOR
M ENTAL H EALTH L. 1–2, http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CBTKUhx
TIvw%3D&tabid=220 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).

58

[VOL. 50: 29, 2013]

Parity at a Price
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

more than 50% of patients with mental illness and have thus been described
as the de facto system of treatment for mental health.”176 Several factors
make primary care providers likely, at least initially, to attempt to resolve
their patients’ mental health problems by prescribing a treatment regime
of psychotropic medications177: their training and background consist
primarily of a biological approach to treating mental illness,178 the treatment
options readily available to them are typically limited to medications,179
their “gatekeeping” responsibilities restrict referrals to mental health
specialists,180 and they have a desire to personally assist their patients—
which also typically reflects the expectations of their patients.181 They
may even avoid assigning patients a mental disorder diagnosis “to
176. W. David Robinson et al., Depression Treatment in Primary Care, 18 J. AM.
BOARD FAM. PRAC. 79, 79 (2005).
177. See BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., supra note 175, at 1–2; Nahid
M. Abed Faghri et al., Understanding the Expanding Role of Primary Care Physicians
(PCPs) to Primary Psychiatric Care Physicians (PPCPs): Enhancing the Assessment and
Treatment of Psychiatric Conditions, 7 MENTAL HEALTH FAM. MED. 17, 20 (2010).
178. The education of most primary care physicians includes a very limited “psych”
rotation, where the treatment options explored are predominantly biological in nature—
the use of psychopharmacological agents. See James A. Clardy et al., The Junior-Year
Psychiatric Clerkship and Medical Students’ Interest in Psychiatry, 24 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
35, 38 (2000).
179. The treatment options immediately available are generally restricted to medications
falling within the healthcare payor’s formulary of approved medications. See Jürgun
Unützer et al., Transforming Mental Health Care at the Interface with General Medicine:
Report for the President’s Commission, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 37, 38 (2006).
180. Under most health care plans, unless it is an emergency, patients are required
to first seek out their primary care physician to address any emerging health care needs.
See Peter J. Cunningham, Beyond Parity: Primary Care Physicians’ Perspectives on Access
to Mental Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. W490, W491, W493 (2009). The primary care
physician, in turn, serves as a “gatekeeper” for determining whether a patient should
instead or in addition see a specialist, such as a mental health provider. Id. Under some
health care plans, primary care physicians are “encouraged” by various means, including
capitation, to minimize the number of these referrals, even though the primary care physician
is typically an internist with limited expertise in mental health issues. Jerome P. Kassirer,
Access to Specialty Care, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1151, 1151 (1994). As a result, generally
only if the primary care physician provides a referral to a specialist will the patient be
able to see a mental health professional. See What Do I Need To Know About My Insurance
Benefits When Seeking Treatment?, MENTAL HEALTH AM., http://www.nmha.org/go/faqs/
insurance (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
181. This devotion to their patients is driven by a number of factors, including their
ethical obligation to provide care and treatment to their patients, the personal bond that is
typically built up over the course of a series of visits that may span years, and the desire
and need to retain their patients’ loyalty and thereby maintain their practice. See Sara
Carmel & Seymour M. Glick, Compassionate-Empathic Physicians: Personality Traits
and Social-Organizational Factors That Enhance or Inhibit This Behavior Pattern, 43
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1253, 1256–58 (1996).
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minimize stigma, to prevent adverse legal or occupational consequences
associated with seeking mental health treatment, or to capture more
health plan benefits than would be available by providing mental health
treatment.”182
With primary care physicians increasingly assuming the role of a
mental health treatment provider, a role they may be only marginally
qualified to fill, their care is likely to fuel a greater number of medical
malpractice suits. Further, the fiscal pressures imposed by managed care
and other third-party payors have increased the volume of patients seen
by these physicians and decreased the amount of time spent with each
one.183 This, in turn, limits their ability to explore patients’ problems,
research and consider treatment options, and develop a working alliance
that can enhance treatment success by encouraging trust, disclosures, and
treatment compliance.184 Also, whereas once the relationship between
health care providers and patients created a bond that made patients
reluctant to sue their health care provider, the reduction in the time spent
together diminishes this protection from liability.185
Given their modest expertise in the area of mental health, primary care
providers must be especially mindful when treating patients for mental
disorders. For example, it has been estimated that primary care physicians
“recognize only half of [their] patients with major depression.”186 Other
studies have found that patients treated with antidepressants in the primary
care setting “did not always receive a dosage and/or a therapy duration
in line with the recommendations included in international guidelines
about depression treatment.”187 Further, close follow-up monitoring,
which is generally absent in this setting,188 is often prudent.189
182. Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1253 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
183. See Debra S. Feldman et al., Effects of Managed Care on Physician-Patient
Relationships, Quality of Care, and the Ethical Practice of Medicine: A Physician Survey,
158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1626, 1629 (1998).
184. See id. at 1630.
185. See id.
186. Gregory E. Simon & Michel VonKorff, Recognition, Management, and Outcomes
of Depression in Primary Care, 4 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 99, 99 (1995).
187. Marco Menchetti et al., Pharmacological Treatment of Depression in Primary
Care: An Updated Literature Review (2000-2009), 8 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY 234, 234
(2011) (citing Wayne Katon et al., Adequacy and Duration of Antidepressant Treatment
in Primary Care, 30 MED. CARE 67 (1992)); see also Simon Gilbody et al., Educational
and Organizations Interventions To Improve the Management of Depression in Primary
Care: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 3145, 3145 (2003) (“Despite the frequency of
presentation and the availability of effective interventions, the diagnosis and treatment of
depression by nonspecialist practitioners often do not follow current guidelines . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)).
188. Leif I. Solberg et al., Follow-Up and Follow-Through of Depressed Patients in
Primary Care: The Critical Missing Components of Quality Care, 18 J. AM. BD. FAM.
PRAC. 520, 521 (2005).
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Thus, primary care physicians are exposing themselves to malpractice
claims for a failure to adequately diagnose, treat, and monitor their
patients once treatment—primarily a prescribed medication—commences.
Referrals to and collaboration with a specialist in mental health care can
help a primary care physician avoid or defeat such claims.190
In addition, partially in response to a shortage of primary care physicians
and a desire for cheaper health care alternatives, a number of states have
extended prescribing privileges to physician assistants and other ancillary
heath care providers.191 Considering that they may have even less training
and expertise in the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric disorders than
primary care physicians,192 their involvement in the delivery of mental
health services is also ripe for litigation.
Similarly, in response to a need for the increased availability of mental
health treatment in rural areas and a belief that “prescription authority is
the next logical step in the professional development of clinical
psychology,”193 two states have enacted legislation enabling psychologists
with specified training to obtain prescribing authority, with other states
189. For example, numerous metaanalyses “suggest a true short-term increase in
suicidal behavior in young adults (aged 18 to 29 years) who receive antidepressants,” the
population most likely to receive this medication. Elizabeth A. O’Connor et al., Screening for
Depression in Adult Patients in Primary Care Settings: A Systematic Evidence Review,
151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 793, 800 (2009).
190. See Unützer et al., supra note 179, at 39. Historically, physicians were solo
practitioners with total autonomy over patients’ well-being. JACALYN DUFFIN, HISTORY
OF MEDICINE: A SCANDALOUSLY SHORT INTRODUCTION 137–38 (2d ed. 2010). Care is
increasingly now provided by a team of providers, with specific health care needs addressed
by various specialists. See Sara Michael, The Future of Healthcare, PHYSICIANS PRAC.
(Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.physicianspractice.com/future-healthcare. Even when a team
approach is not employed, health care providers are expected to consult with other
specialists as needed and to refer patients to a specialist when a patient’s treatment needs
exceed the provider’s expertise. 1 STEVEN E. PEGALIS & HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN
LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §§ 3:2, 3:10 (2d ed. 1992); see also supra notes 76,
145–47, infra note 196 and accompanying text.
191. See Roderick S. Hooker, Prescribing by Physician Assistants and Nurse
Practitioners, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.ajmc.com/articles/
AJMC_10decHooker_Xcl_e356to7 (noting “an ever-widening sphere of prescribers”);
Julia Johnson, Student Article, Whether States Should Create Prescription Power for
Psychologists, 33 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 167, 167 (2009) (“[D]entists, optometrists,
podiatrists, and nurses with various advanced degrees all have some prescription power in
most states.”).
192. See In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 16, 850 A.2d 346, 351 (acknowledging
that physician assistants are not as well-trained as psychiatrists).
193. James E. Long, Jr., Student Article, Power To Prescribe: The Debate Over
Prescription Privileges for Psychologists and the Legal Issues Implicated, 29 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 243, 248–49 (2005).
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considering this option.194 Granting psychologists this power is
controversial, and opponents argue that the training programs are not
sufficient,195 with a better solution being to “increase mental health
training for general practitioners and encourage collaboration between
the two professions.”196
What is clear, however, is that psychologists who obtain prescribing
power open themselves up to the increased liability associated with
prescribing medications.197 As for the governing standard of care, courts
may hold them to the same standard as physicians or compare them to
other prescribing nonphysicians with a similar level of training and
education, with the latter resulting in the application of a more lenient
standard.198 Given that courts typically have not employed the physician
standard in cases involving other nonphysician prescribers,199 a similar
approach may well be used with psychologists.200 Regardless, the increase
in liability exposure accompanying prescribing power will most likely
cause psychologists to increase their malpractice coverage and fees.201
VII. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS
The prescribing of psychotropic medications to children and adolescents
is also rife with uncertainty and potential liability for mental health
providers. It is estimated that roughly twenty percent of individuals
eighteen years and younger meet the criteria for a psychiatric diagnosis,202
with half of them suffering a significant functional impairment as a

194. See Johnson, supra note 191, at 167 (“With the relatively recent legislation in New
Mexico and Louisiana, states are being forced, at the very least, to broach the subject
within their respective governments.”); Long, supra note 193, at 244–45. Psychologists
can also prescribe psychotropic medications in Guam. Nancy A. Melville, Physicians Fight
To Keep Psychologists from Prescribing, MEDSCAPE (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.medscape.
com/viewarticle/781519.
195. Long, supra note 193, at 251–52.
196. Id. at 253; see also supra notes 75–76, 145, 165, 190 and accompanying text.
197. See Johnson, supra note 191, at 175.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., In re Abdo, 2002-2513, p. 6–7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/9/03); 852 So. 2d
513, 518 (holding that the applicable standard for a nurse prescribing medication is the
“nursing standard of care”); Silves v. King, 970 P.2d 790, 795 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that nurse did not have a duty to warn patient of potentially harmful drug interactions
because nurse is not qualified to assess risks as a physician is).
200. See Johnson, supra note 191, at 175.
201. See id. at 176.
202. See Myron L. Belfer, Child and Adolescent Mental Disorders: The Magnitude
of the Problem Across the Globe, 49 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 226, 226 (2008);
see also supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
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result of their mental disorder.203 Research also indicates that these
disorders can have long-term effects, as mental illness can dramatically
reduce life expectancy, life satisfaction, and lifetime income.204
A national study found that half of those who experience a mental
illness begin to show symptoms by the age of fourteen, that these symptoms
often go untreated, and that untreated mental disorders can lead to more
severe and difficult-to-treat illnesses.205 A professor of health care
policy at Harvard Medical School who conducted this study explained:
“The pattern appears to be that the earlier in life the disorder begins, the
slower an individual is to seek therapy, and the more persistent the
illness.”206 The parties responsible for these children may miss or ignore
these symptoms, hoping or believing they represent a “passing phase,”
while the child may believe likewise or attempt to hide symptoms out of
confusion, embarrassment, self-loathing, anger, distrust, or fear.207

203. Andrés Martin & Douglas Leslie, Psychiatric Inpatient, Outpatient, and Medication
Utilization and Costs Among Privately Insured Youths, 1997–2000, 160 AM J. PSYCHIATRY
757, 757 (2003) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 100).
204. See Ronald C. Kessler et al., Individual and Societal Effects of Mental Disorders on
Earnings in the United States: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication,
165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 703, 709 fig.2 (2008) (finding serious mental illnesses have
significant effects on earnings); Sami Pirkola et al., General Health and Quality-Of-Life
Measures in Active, Recent, and Comorbid Mental Disorders: A Population-Based Health
2000 Study, 50 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 108, 108 (2009) (concluding that anxiety
and depressive disorders lead to low health and quality of life); Dominic Hughes, Mentally Ill
Have Reduced Life Expectancy, Study Finds, BBC NEWS (May 17, 2011, 8:59 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-13414965 (“People suffering from serious mental illnesses
. . . can have a life expectancy 10 to 15 years lower than the . . . average.”); Alan Mozes,
Kids’ Psychological Problems Have Long Term Effects, U.S. NEWS: HEALTH (May 17, 2010),
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-health/brain-and-behavior/articles/2010/05/17/
kids-psychological-problems-have-long-term-effects (describing how mental illness diminishes
lifetime income by as much as twenty percent and reduces the likelihood of marriage).
205. Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, Mental Illness Exacts Heavy Toll,
Beginning in Youth (June 6, 2005), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/science-news/2005/mentalillness-exacts-heavy-toll-beginning-in-youth.shtml; see also Ian Colman et al., Forty-Year
Psychiatric Outcomes Following Assessment for Internalizing Disorder in Adolescence,
164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 126, 128 (2007) (finding that about seventy percent of adolescents
who had an internalizing disorder at both ages thirteen and fifteen had a mental disorder
at age thirty-six, forty-three, or fifty-three, compared with about twenty-five percent of
mentally healthy adolescents).
206. Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, supra note 205 (quoting Dr. Ronald Kessler,
Professor of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School).
207. See Carolyn A. McCarty et al., Adolescents with Suicidal Ideation: Health Care
Use and Functioning, 11 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 422, 424–25 (2011) (discussing the limited
numbers of teens receiving the proper mental health care they need due to low detection
rates). Victims of child abuse show particularly high rates of mental disorders. See Thomas
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Even more so than the use of psychotropic medication prescriptions in
general, their use with children and adolescents has exploded over the
past two decades. A national study found that from 1993 to 2009 the
percentage of visits to office-based physicians in which antipsychotic
medications were provided increased over sevenfold for children, almost
fivefold for adolescents, and slightly less than twofold for adults.208
There was “a particularly marked increase” in the use of these medications
for youths with a mood disorder, as by the end of the study period almost
one-third of office visits involving this diagnosis incorporated such
medication.209 Similarly, the prescribing of medications for attentiondeficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children ages five through
fourteen rose dramatically, while “treatment in preschoolers increased
approximately 3-fold during the early 1990s.”210 It has been noted that
“[ADHD] and other disruptive disorders account for . . . 37.8%[] of
antipsychotic use” in youth,211 with a 2007 national survey finding that
“4.8% of all children aged 4–17 (2.7 million) were taking medication for
ADHD.”212 In addition, over the course of a decade, the use of antipsychotic
medication to treat youth with an anxiety disorder roughly doubled.213
Proponents of these medications have identified several factors
justifying their use, including increasing evidence of childhood psychiatric
conditions, the public’s greater acceptance of biological interventions,
and an increase in the number of pediatric clinical trials demonstrating

L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse and Society’s Response,
36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819, 824 (2010).
208. Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1248–49, 1249 tbl.1 (concluding that office
visits with a prescribed or supplied antipsychotic medication increased from 0.24% to
1.83% for patients zero to thirteen years of age, from 0.78% to 3.76% for patients
fourteen to twenty years of age, and from 3.25% to 6.18% for adults). Another national
survey determined that from 1994 to 2001 the rate of visits by an adolescent to a
physician’s office resulting in a psychotropic prescription more than doubled from 3.4%
in 1994–1995 to 8.3% in 2000–2001, with one out of ten office visits by adolescent
males in 2001 resulting in such a prescription. Cindy Parks Thomas et al., Trends in the
Use of Psychotropic Medications Among Adolescents, 1994 to 2001, 57 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 63, 65–66 (2006).
209. Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1250.
210. Julie Mango Zito et al., Trending in the Prescribing of Psychotropic Medications to
Preschoolers, 283 JAMA 1025, 1025, 1028 (2000).
211. Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1247 (citing Mark Olfson et al., National Trends in
the Outpatient Treatment of Children and Adolescents with Antipsychotic Drugs,
63 A RCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 679 (2006)).
212. S. N. Visser et al., Increasing Prevalence of Parent-Reported AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Among Children—United States, 2003 and 2007, 59
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1439, 1441 (2010).
213. Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1247 (citing Jonathan S. Comer et al., National
Trends in the Antipsychotic Treatment of Psychiatric Outpatients with Anxiety Disorders, 168
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1057 (2011)).
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the safety and effectiveness of these medications for children.214 In
addition, this usage has been supported by third-party payors, as these
medications are typically less costly than a series of sessions with a
mental health therapist or inpatient hospitalization.215
However, one report found that a sixfold rise in payments to Minnesota
psychiatrists by drug makers for attending programs at which these
medications were discussed coincided with a ninefold increase in the
prescriptions of antipsychotics for children enrolled in the state’s Medicaid
program.216 Further, psychiatrists receiving at least $5000 in speaking
fees from an antipsychotic drug’s manufacturer wrote three times as
many prescriptions for the drug.217
In addition, even more so than for the general public,218 off-label
psychiatric medication prescriptions for youth are commonplace.219
A conservative estimate is that fifty to seventy-five percent of these
prescriptions are off-label, meaning the FDA has not specifically approved
the drug for use in this context.220 Reasons given for the lack of clinical
drug trials specifically targeting children include “relatively small
market share, fear of legal liability, potential long-term adverse effects,
the reluctance of parents to give permission to allow their children to be
research subjects, and the lack of adequate research funding.”221
Despite its prevalence, safety concerns remain for youths prescribed
psychotropic medications off-label.222 In addition to the fact that the
medications have not been directly proven safe or efficacious for this
214. Martin & Leslie, supra note 203, at 757–58.
215. See id. at 758.
216. Gardiner Harris et al., Psychiatrists, Troubled Children and Drug Industry’s Role,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2007, at A1.
217. Id. See generally Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 110.
218. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
219. See Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1251 (“Only a small proportion of child
and adolescent antipsychotic [office-based physician] visits included an FDA clinical
indication[.]”).
220. Julie M. Zito et al., Off-Label Psychopharmacologic Prescribing for Children:
History Supports Close Clinical Monitoring, CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY &
MENTAL HEALTH (Sept. 2008), http://www.capmh.com/content/2/1/24 (citing Rosemary
Roberts et al., Pediatric Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and Efficacy of Pediatric
Therapies, 290 JAMA 905 (2003)); see also Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1252 tbl.4
(finding no FDA-approved indication for 94.0% of antipsychotic office-based physician visits
involving children, 87.3% involving adolescents, and 71.6% involving adults).
221. Charles J. Coté et al., Commentary, Is the “Therapeutic Orphan” About To Be
Adopted?, 98 PEDIATRICS 118, 120 (1996) (citing Carolyn H. Asbury, The Orphan Drug
Act: The First 7 Years, 265 JAMA 893 (1991)).
222. See id.; Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1252–54.
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use, as one commentator explains, “[t]he central nervous system and the
neurotransmitters and receptors on which psychotropic agents act are in
a period of substantial growth, development, and refinement through
childhood and adolescence,” and animal studies have shown permanent
changes in receptor systems following exposure to psychotropic drugs in
developing mammalian brains, which warrants “great caution.”223 It has
also been noted that “[y]oung people may be especially sensitive to the
adverse metabolic effects of second-generation antipsychotics[,] . . . [as]
children may be more vulnerable to antipsychotic-induced weight gain
and perhaps even to antipsychotic-associated diabetes.”224 Thus, due to
the physiological differences between adults and children, a showing of
safety and efficacy when used with adults will not necessarily be replicated
in children.225
In a 2004 case, the plaintiffs claimed their thirteen-year-old son
committed suicide because he took the antidepressant Zoloft, which had
not been approved by the FDA for the treatment of pediatric depression.226
Although the case was ultimately dismissed,227 the FDA subsequently
recommended that Pfizer conduct studies testing Zoloft with children
and adolescents.228 The outcome of these tests indicated a modest but
measurable increase in the risk of suicide among pediatric patients being
treated with antidepressants in general.229
Calls have been issued for more research on the safety of pediatric
medications in general, and particularly with regard to psychotropic
medications administered to juveniles.230 It has been argued that a
223. Peter S. Jensen, Ethical and Pragmatic Issues in the Use of Psychotropic Agents in
Young Children, 43 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 585, 586 (1998).
224. Olfson et al., supra note 129, at 1248 (footnotes omitted).
225. See M INA K. D ULCAN , D ULCAN’ S T EXTBOOK OF C HILD AND A DOLESCENT
P SYCHIATRY 674 (2010).
226. Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 356 F.3d 1326, 1327 (10th Cir. 2004).
227. Miller v. Pfizer Inc. (Roerig Div.), 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1131 (D. Kan. 2002),
aff’d sub nom. Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 356 F.3d 1326.
228. See Tarek A. Hammad et al., Suicidality in Pediatric Patients Treated
with Antidepressant Drugs, 63 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 332, 332 (2006).
229. Id.; see also David A. Brent et al., Predictors of Spontaneous and Systematically
Assessed Suicidal Adverse Events in the Treatment of SSRI-Resistant Depression in
Adolescents (TORDIA) Study, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 418, 418 (2009) (“The relationship
of venlafaxine and benzodiazepines to [adverse] self-harm events [in treatment-resistant,
depressed adolescents] requires further study and clinical caution.”).
230. DARCY E. GRUTTADARO & JOEL E. MILLER, NAMI POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
TASK FORCE REPORT: CHILDREN AND PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS 2 (2004), available at
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Research_Services_and_Treatment&template
=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=36682; Brent et al., supra note
229, at 424; Alina Selyukh, Advisers Urge FDA To Address Antipsychotics in Kids, REUTERS
(Sept. 22, 2011, 6:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/22/us-usa-fda-antipsychotic
-idUSTRE78L77L20110922 (sixteen of seventeen advisers urged the FDA to pay particular
attention to potential problems for children during its newest phase of drug monitoring).
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history of missteps in pediatric drug safety231 requires “reassessing and
updating the level of confidence” in prescribing medications for children,
and that this need is “particularly true for the treatment of emotional and
behavioral disorders” in children because of:
1) the rapid, expanded use of many drugs for psychotherapeutic purposes [in
children], both singly and in combination; 2) the absence of current guidelines for
prescribing of off-label psychotropic drugs . . . 3) the absence of objective markers
of emotional and behavioral conditions which can limit solid decisionmaking on
the [proper] use of psychotropic medications; and 4) the [absence of] close clinical
monitoring and the engagement of parents and caregivers in such activities.232

As noted, complicating this issue is the fact that the scientific
community and the American public are largely unwilling to expose
children to experimental clinical trials to test the safety and efficacy of
these drugs in this age group because of the possible risk to the
participants in these studies.233 However, such trials are needed to detect
side effects that may only appear when these medications are administered
to children and which may only manifest themselves after an extended
period of time.234 Because mental illness tends to be a chronic condition,

231. Zito et al., supra note 220 (explaining that history has shown that “elementary
school age children can also be at increased risk of adverse events and can experience
problems distinctly different from adults treated with the same drug,” citing the antibiotic
tetracycline as an example, which after being “widely acclaimed and enthusiastically
prescribed when it was introduced in 1955,” was later shown to be “responsible for
hypoplasia and staining of enamel of primary and secondary teeth,” as well as the antiepileptic
Phenobarbital, which has been shown to diminish intelligence and cause behavioral
problems in children and adolescents following long-term use (footnotes omitted)).
232. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also A. Rachel Camp, A Mistreated Epidemic: State
and Federal Failure To Adequately Regulate Psychotropic Medications Prescribed to
Children in Foster Care, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 373 (2011) (explaining that the majority
of states do not regulate psychotropic medications administered to children placed in the
state’s legal custody in any meaningful way).
233. See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text; see also Jennifer ChengShannon et al., Second-Generation Antipsychotic Medications in Children and Adolescents,
14 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 372, 372 (2004) (discussing how
most studies are anecdotal or short-term studies); Should Your Child Be in a Clinical
Trial?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/consumerupdates/
ucm048699.htm (last updated Oct. 22, 2012) (“Up until the last decade, children were
rarely included in studies of medical treatments. As a result, much is still unknown about
how children respond to drugs . . . .”).
234. Cheng-Shannon et al., supra note 233, at 372 (“[L]ong-term follow-up
investigations and ongoing clinical monitoring are necessary to confirm [SGAs’] safety in
[children].”); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 233; supra notes 222–25
and accompanying text.
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the lack of long-term clinical trials assessing the longitudinal impact of
these medications is of particular concern.
Concerns have also been expressed that these medications are being
prescribed primarily as a “quick-fix” behavioral-management tool by
physicians without adequate mental health training, with needed
psychosocial interventions being bypassed and insufficient attention
being given to the potentially harmful effects of these drugs.235 Not
surprisingly, insufficient attention to the prescribing of medications for
children appears to occur most frequently among children who are least
likely to have someone watching out for their needs and interests.236
Children in foster care are three to four times more likely to be on a
psychotropic medication than other children who are the recipients of
Medicaid-funded services.237 It has been postulated these medications
are being used to “manage” rather than “treat” these children, thus
unnecessarily exposing many of them to potential long-term detrimental
side effects.238 A study of the Texas foster care system revealed that
forty-one percent of the children prescribed psychotropic drugs received
three or more different medications, raising polypharmacy concerns.239
A Government Accountability Office report highlighted that in each of
five states examined, foster children were prescribed psychotropic
medications much more frequently, and called for greater guidance to states
on the prescribing of these medications to foster children.240

235. Steven Reinberg, More Kids Taking Antipsychotics for ADHD: Study, HEALTHDAY
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://consumer.healthday.com/Article.asp?AID=667425 (noting that
researchers found that “controlling ‘disruptive behavior’ accounted for 63% of the reason
antipsychotics were given to children,” while one psychiatrist asserted that these drugs
“have ruined the brains of millions of children” (quoting Dr. Peter Breggin, Psychiatrist)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
236. See Camp, supra note 232, at 373 (explaining that the psychotropic medication
prescription rate for foster children is up to fifty percent, while the prescription rate for
children in the general population is approximately four percent).
237. David Sessions, Psychotropic Drug Abuse in Foster Care Costs Government
Billions, POL . D AILY (June 17, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/06/17/
psychotropic-drug-abuse-in-foster-care-costs-government-billions/ (“[I]n 2003 a Florida
Statewide Advocacy Council study found that 55 percent of Florida’s foster children
were being administered psychotropic medications. Forty percent of them had no record
of a psychiatric evaluation.”).
238. Camp, supra note 232, at 373.
239. Id. at 378 (citing Prescription Psychotropic Drug Use Among Children in
Foster Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Income Sec. and Family Support of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 9 (2008) (statement of Dr. Julie M. Zito, Ph.D.,
Professor of Pharmacy and Psychiatry, Pharm. Health Servs. Research, Univ. of Md.,
Balt.)); see also supra notes 156, 166–70 and accompanying text.
240. Introduction to U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOSTER CHILDREN: HHS
GUIDANCE COULD HELP STATES IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF PSYCHOTROPIC PRESCRIPTIONS
(2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586570.pdf (finding that forty percent of
foster children in Massachusetts receive psychotropic medication); see also Camp, supra
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Given all the uncertainty surrounding the safety of pediatric psychotropic
medications and the sympathetic nature of a child-plaintiff in a lawsuit
alleging harm from an inappropriate prescription or monitoring of such a
medication, there is considerable potential here as well for increased
malpractice liability exposure for involved mental health professionals.
VIII. INFORMED CONSENT AND ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
The doctrine of informed consent has two components: a health care
provider’s duty to disclose relevant treatment-related information to the
patient and an accompanying duty to obtain the patient’s consent before
commencing treatment.241 Notwithstanding that the doctrine has
longstanding roots in American jurisprudence as an outgrowth of the
fundamental principle that a patient has a right to bodily autonomy,242
legal recognition of a cause of action for a failure to obtain informed
consent is a relatively recent phenomenon.243 The first articulation of
the phrase “informed consent” did not appear in a published judicial
opinion until 1957,244 and the first successful application of a related
cause of action did not occur until 1972.245 Shortly thereafter, however,
a sea change in judicial and societal views regarding patient decisionmaking
note 232, at 373–74 (discussing movement toward increased state regulation of psychotropic
prescriptions for foster children); Michelle L. Mello, Note, Psychotropic Medication and
Foster Care Children: A Prescription for State Oversight, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 395, 418–
19 (2012) (describing the Government Accountability Office’s investigation and findings).
241. 1 STEVEN E. PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 4:1 (3d ed.
2005).
242. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”), overruled on other grounds by
Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1957).
243. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician’s
Fiduciary Duty To Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1167, 1205 (2009). Dating back to Hippocrates, treatment decisions were regarded
as the sole prerogative of physicians, who were entitled and even encouraged to deceive
patients about the course of treatment if they concluded deception was in the patient’s
best interest. Lori B. Andrews, The Right and Rite of Informed Consent, 21 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 765, 766 (1988).
244. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1957) (involving a patient who awoke from surgery paralyzed and a physician
who admitted he failed to disclose the dangers of the surgical procedure beforehand).
245. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that
physician has a duty to disclose the material risks associated with a proposed procedure
that a reasonable patient would need to receive to make an informed decision).
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authority occurred and informed consent became the accepted law of the
land, with causes of action for a failure to obtain consent now universally
recognized.246
As a result of the high premium placed on informed consent, if a
patient retains decisionmaking capacity and chooses not to undergo a
recommended treatment, a physician generally cannot force or otherwise
provide this treatment.247 Additionally, individuals can execute an
“advance directive” that directs the treatment to be provided or withheld
if the person later loses decisionmaking capacity.248 Although the use of
advance directives is also a relatively recent phenomenon, there has been
little opposition to them,249 largely because they have typically been
limited to the forgoing of medical treatment when (1) a patient is terminally
ill or continued treatment is futile and extremely painful, and (2) there is
little controversy the patient lacks decisionmaking capacity at the time.250
Nevertheless, the law also recognizes exceptions to the informed
consent requirement, particularly during a medical emergency.251 For
example, a federal district court ruled a county jail physician exercised
reasonable professional judgment in forcibly injecting an inmate with an
antipsychotic drug after being informed the inmate was banging her head
against a cell door, as that constituted a medical emergency.252 Another
widely discussed exception involves the “therapeutic privilege,” which
allows a physician to withhold information from a patient when disclosure

246. See Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health
Care, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 245, 265–66 (2000).
247. See Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis, Overriding Mental Health Treatment
Refusals: How Much Process Is “Due”?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 501, 525–26 (2008); see also
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277, 279 (1990) (“[T]he commonlaw doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a
competent individual to refuse medical treatment. . . . [W]e assume that the United States
Constitution would [also] grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”).
248. Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One’s Say?, 89
KY. L.J. 327, 343–44 (2001).
249. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 290 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Delegating the authority
to make medical decisions to a family member or friend is becoming a common method
of planning for the future.”); Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical
Care—A Case for Greater Use, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 889, 889 (1991); Sam J. Saad III,
Living Wills: Validity and Morality, 30 VT. L. REV. 71, 89 (2005); Maria J. Silveira et
al., Advance Directives and Outcomes of Surrogate Decision Making Before Death, 362
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211, 1212 (2010).
250. See Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of
the Jurisprudence of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 189 (2001).
251. See Luka v. Lowrie, 136 N.W. 1106, 1110 (Mich. 1912).
252. Anglin v. City of Aspen, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1218–22, 1224–25 (D. Colo.
2008).

70

[VOL. 50: 29, 2013]

Parity at a Price
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

might cause the patient harm.253 The rationale is that “patients may be
upset by [the] disclosure of unpleasant information, and thereby
rendered unable to make a rational treatment decision, or they may even
[as a result of the disclosure] suffer psychological damage.”254 However,
because what constitutes harm or damage to a patient can be defined
quite broadly, it has been cautioned that “the therapeutic privilege exception
threatens . . . to swallow the informed consent doctrine whole.”255 Thus,
“[t]he privilege is rarely invoked to dismiss [an informed consent cause
of action].”256 To the extent mental health providers misinterpret the
applicability of either exception to a given case, they risk a professional
liability claim.
It should also be noted that considerable concern has been expressed
that advance directives will be abused when individuals with a disability
are involved.257 The fear is that because their lives have traditionally
been less valued or their early demise welcomed by caregivers weary of
providing them with support, they will be pressured and coerced into
executing advance directives forgoing life-sustaining treatment or that
their directives will be prematurely implemented.258
A number of states have also enacted provisions extending the
availability of advance directives to encompass directions for future
mental health care.259 Often referred to as “psychiatric advance directives”
(PADs), they have typically been promoted as a means by which persons
with a mental illness, while they have decisionmaking capacity, can
ensure that they receive psychiatric treatment should they later refuse
treatment after losing decisionmaking capacity,260 which may be defined
broadly.261 A “Ulysses Clause” is often included establishing an irrevocable

253. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 341 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 342.
257. See Ruth F. Maron, Note, Who Has a Will To Live? Why State Requirements for
Advance Directives Should Be Uniform(ly Revised), 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 169, 173, 189
(2011).
258. See id. at 189 & n.137 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES AND ADVANCE CARE PLANNING: REPORT TO CONGRESS, at xii (2008)).
259. Dunlap, supra note 248, at 370–71.
260. See id. at 344.
261. Id. at 354 (“The [directive] springs into effect not upon the consumer’s
incompetence, but rather, upon the consumer’s deterioration to the point where medication
and treatment would be beneficial.”).
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acceptance of certain treatments despite the individual’s subsequent
refusal of them during a mental health crisis.262 Alternatively, the PAD
can direct that the person not be subjected to specific psychiatric
treatments, with the side effects of various antipsychotic medications
generally providing the rationale for these refusals.263
Among the concerns expressed about PADs are that persons with a
mental illness will be pressured or coerced into executing a PAD
authorizing future psychiatric treatment as a condition for release from
placement in a mental health facility, to avoid court-ordered treatment or
restraint, or to appease family members or other individuals responsible
for their support,264 or that PADs will later be implemented to facilitate
treatment over objection even though the person retains decisionmaking
capacity or to bypass an otherwise required procedure such as obtaining
a court order.265 Additionally, the asymmetrical nature of PADs has
been noted, as authorizing statutes typically enable a treating physician
to override a PAD if the physician determines a given course of
treatment is in the patient’s best interests, while the patient remains bound
to a previously expressed treatment directive.266 Finally, some argue
against PADs because individuals executing them may demand treatment
methods that do not conform to the standard of care or are difficult to
readily access and employ.267
PADs have been cited as another potentially expanding area of
liability for mental health providers.268 If a patient is harmed as a result
of a provider’s failure to comply with an advance directive, the patient
may be able to recover damages under “a theory of negligence, battery,

262. Id. at 351–52. The directive may also authorize future hospitalization. Id. at 353–
54.
263. See id. at 368.
264. See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Psychiatric Advance Directives: An Alternative
to Coercive Treatment?, 63 PSYCHIATRY: INTERPERSONAL & BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 160,
169 (2000).
265. See Breanne M. Sheetz, Note, The Choice To Limit Choice: Using Psychiatric
Advance Directives To Manage the Effects of Mental Illness and Support Self-Responsibility,
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 411 (2007).
266. See Karl A. Menninger, II, Advance Directives for Medical and Psychiatric
Care, in 102 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 95 § 29 (2008); Elizabeth Ann Rosenfeld,
Note, Mental Health Advance Directives: A False Sense of Autonomy for the Nation’s Aging
Population, 9 ELDER L.J. 53, 53–54 (2001) (arguing mental health advance directives do
more to protect health care providers than patients).
267. See Psychiatric Advance Directives: Issue Summary, NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH
ASS’N, http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/download.cfm?DownloadFile=44AD883D1372-4D20-C8CE19A1830E1C8B (last visited Mar. 31, 2012); John Petrila & Jeffrey
Swanson, Mental Illness, Law, and a Public Health Law Research Agenda, PUB. HEALTH
L. RES. 34–35 (Dec. 2010), http://publichealthlawresearch.org/sites/default/files/Petrila%20%
20Swanson%20TPE%20paper-%20Final%20Paginated%20(1).pdf.
268. See Dunlap, supra note 248, at 364.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress, or negligent infliction of
emotional distress.”269 At the same time, if a provider implements a
PAD when it is inapplicable—such as when the patient retains
decisionmaking capacity—or has been improperly executed, and treats a
competent patient over the patient’s objection or contrary to an otherwise
binding directive from the patient or a surrogate, the provider may face a
lawsuit for treating a patient without informed consent.270 However,
many states authorizing the use of PADs afford physicians immunity if
they have acted in good faith or permit a physician to override treatment
objections following involuntary civil commitment of the patient.271
With regard to civil commitment, the underlying rule was once that
persons who met the applicable commitment criteria were presumed
incapable, as a consequence of their mental disorder, of giving informed
consent and thus could be treated over their objection during the ensuing
hospitalization.272 This position has now widely been rejected, with a
separate determination of a lack of decisionmaking capacity required
before treatment can be administered over objection.273 Nevertheless, the
right and ability of institutionalized individuals to refuse treatment is an

269. Kathleen E. Wherthey, Cause of Action To Recover Damages for Health Care
Provider’s Failure To Comply with Advance Directive, 16 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 83, 83
(2001); see also Leonard Berlin, Malpractice Issues in Radiology: Do Not Resuscitate,
175 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 1513, 1513 (2000) (describing lawsuit against physician who
violated a do-not-resuscitate order); Renee H. Martin, Liability for Failing To Follow
Advance Directives, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIG. (Sept. 14, 1999), http://www.physiciansnews.
com/1999/09/14/liability-for-failing-to-follow-advance-directives/ (explaining potential
liability resulting from failure to follow an advance directive). But see Dunlap, supra
note 248, at 364 (“Following an advance directive, particularly in a state where there is
immunity for good faith adherence to directives, is not likely to result in litigation—at
least not successful litigation.”); Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance
Directives: Wrongful Living and Tort Law Incentives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 139–42 (2008)
(asserting that existing law provides inadequate remedies for failing to adhere to an advance
directive).
270. See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 291–92 (citing Conservatorship of Waltz,
227 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Ct. App. 1986)); Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton,
Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM.
J.L. & MED. 429, 429–30 (2006).
271. See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Overriding Psychiatric Advance Directives: Factors
Associated with Psychiatrists’ Decisions To Preempt Patients’ Advance Refusal of
Hospitalization and Medication, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 77, 78–79 (2007).
272. Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190, 1210–11 (1974).
273. See Christyne E. Ferris, Note, The Search for Due Process in Civil Commitment
Hearings: How Procedural Realities Have Altered Substantive Standards, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 959, 963–64 (2008).
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ongoing issue.274 Compounding concerns are recent changes to various
related mental health laws, such as broadening the criteria for civil
commitment and enhancing the availability of outpatient civil commitment,
which expand the circumstances under which a state can exercise control
over persons with a mental disorder, ostensibly to provide for the safety
and well-being of the individual and society, but which also facilitate the
state’s ability to encourage or impose treatment without informed
consent.275 Again, predicting incorrectly when treatment over objection
can be administered can expose mental health providers to liability.
Further complicating matters, imposing mental health treatment over
the objection of an individual can be countertherapeutic.276 Particularly
if the patient is not given an opportunity to express opposition, imposing
treatment can exacerbate the patient’s mental health problems.277 To
enhance mental health care and reduce the risk of a professional liability
suit, any bypassing of the normal informed consent process should occur

274. See Nathan T. Sidley, The Right of Involuntary Patients in Mental Institutions
To Refuse Drug Treatment, J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 231 (1984); see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 125 (2000) (“The question of the
right to refuse antipsychotic medication remains the most important and volatile aspect
of the legal regulation of mental health practice.”); Kurt M. Hartman & Bryan A. Liang,
Exceptions to Informed Consent in Emergency Medicine, HOSP. PHYSICIAN, Mar. 1999,
at 53, 55–57 (explaining circumstances in which doctors should be allowed to, or
perhaps even should, treat resisting patients, and circumstances in which doctors should
not be allowed to treat resisting patients).
275. See Michael Allen & Vicki Fox Smith, Opening Pandora’s Box: The Practical
and Legal Dangers of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
342, 342–43 (2001); John Monahan, Tarasoff at Thirty: How Developments in Science
and Policy Shape the Common Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 497, 515 (2006) (“Mandating
adherence to mental health treatment in the community through outpatient commitment
has become the most contested issue in mental health law. . . . With the 1999 enactment
in New York State of ‘Kendra’s Law,’ . . . nationwide interest in outpatient commitment
has greatly increased.”); Outpatient and Civil Commitment, BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL
HEALTH L., http://www.bazelon.org/Where-We-Stand/Self-Determination/Forced-Treatment/
Outpatient-and-Civil-Commitment.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); Scott C. Fears &
Ann Hackman, Commentary, Outpatient Commitment: A Treatment Tool for the Mentally
Ill?, VIRTUAL MENTOR (Jan. 2009), http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2009/01/pdf/ccas20901.pdf.
276. For a review of the empirical research on the therapeutic jurisprudence value
of a right to refuse treatment, see PERLIN, supra note 274, at 279–85.
277. See id. at 278–79 (arguing that in psychiatry the right to refuse treatment and
informed consent are particularly important for maintaining a therapeutic doctor-patient
relationship); see also Norman G. Poythress et al., Perceived Coercion and Procedural
Justice in the Broward Mental Health Court, 25 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 517, 520, 530–
31 (2002) (finding that when offenders with a mental disorder participating in a mental
health court perceived the proceedings to be fair, which included being treated with respect
and dignity and being permitted to present their position to the decisionmaker, their
acceptance of and compliance with the outcome of the proceedings were enhanced, even
when an adverse ruling was issued).
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only under very limited circumstances.278 From a pragmatic perspective,
a client’s satisfaction with and trust in a mental health provider diminishes
the likelihood that a suit will be brought.279 It follows that proceeding
with treatment without first obtaining a client’s informed consent,
particularly if forcibly administered over objection, increases the likelihood
a client will pursue a professional liability claim.
IX. TARASOFF-RELATED LIABILITY
No discussion of emerging professional liability would be complete
without a discussion of the impact of the landmark case of Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California,280 the first case to establish that
mental health providers have a duty to take steps to protect reasonably
foreseeable victims of their patients.281 Tarasoff has been characterized
as “one of the single most celebrated cases in the recent history of
American tort law,”282 with “no court ruling ha[ving] had a broader or
more enduring impact on day-to-day mental health practice.”283

278. PERLIN, supra note 274, at 155.
279. See Henry Thomas Stelfox et al., The Relation of Patient Satisfaction
with Complaints Against Physicians and Malpractice Lawsuits, 118 AM. J. MED. 1126,
1126 (2005); see also supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
280. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
281. Id. at 340. It should be noted that a failure to predict and prevent suicidal
behavior by a client may raise many of the same issues discussed in this subpart. See L.
D. Hankoff, Assessment and Prediction of Suicide, 268 JAMA 3257, 3275 (1992) (reviewing
ASSESSMENT AND PREDICTION OF SUICIDE (Ronald W. Maris et al. eds., 1992)); Jacqueline M.
Melonas, Patients at Risk for Suicide: Risk Management and Patient Safety Considerations
To Protect the Patient and the Physician, INNOVATIONS CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE, Mar.
2011, at 45, 45; L. Sher, Commentary, Preventing Suicide, 97 Q.J. MED. 677, 677 (2004);
April R. Smith et al., Revisiting Impulsivity in Suicide: Implications for Civil Liability of
Third Parties, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 779, 779 (2008); Murray, supra note 80, at 641–42.
For representative cases, see Patton v. Thompson, 958 So. 2d 303, 313 (Ala. 2006),
Kockelman v. Segal, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, 553–54 (Ct. App. 1998), and Almonte v. Kurl,
46 A.3d 1, 8 (R.I. 2012).
282. Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 97 (1994); see also
Thomas G. Gutheil, Moral Justification for Tarasoff-Type Warnings and Breach
of Confidentiality: A Clinician’s Perspective, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 345, 345 (2001)
(calling Tarasoff “one of the most significant developments in medico-legal jurisprudence of
the past century” (citations omitted)).
283. Douglas Mossman, Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or, Kant Meets Tarasoff,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 526 (2006); see also Patrick K. Fox, Commentary, So the
Pendulum Swings—Making Sense of the Duty To Protect, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 474, 477 (2010) (“The decision’s impact on the practice of psychiatry was immediate
and profound . . . .”); Mossman, supra, at 524 (“[T]hirty years after its promulgation,
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Lawmakers and commentators, however, “remain divided on the wisdom
and proper application of Tarasoff,”284 with “the medical, scientific and
policy judgments that undergird Tarasoff decisions need[ing] to be
revisited regularly to reflect . . . new developments . . . in violence risk
assessment, violence prevention, mental health services, and theories
and developments in tort liability.”285
In Tarasoff, a young man, Prosenjit Podder, stalked and murdered a
young woman, Tatiana Tarasoff, with whom he was infatuated, after
indicating to his treating psychologist his intention to do so.286 According to
the California Supreme Court, when a therapist determines or reasonably
should have determined under the applicable professional standard that a
patient poses “a serious danger of violence” to a third party, the therapist
has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect that third party from the
danger posed by the patient.287
The court’s decision generated considerable criticism,288 accompanied
by prophecies of the demise of mental health care.289 Among the criticisms

Tarasoff remains, to mental health professionals, the most influential ruling in mental
disability law.”).
284. Ann Hubbard, Symposium Introduction, The Future of “The Legal Duty To
Protect”: Scientific and Legal Perspectives on Tarasoff’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 429, 429 (2006) (“Courts and legislatures have embraced, expanded, restricted or
rejected Tarasoff’s basic premise that mental health professionals have a duty to predict
which of their patients will commit acts of violence and to protect third parties from that
violence.” (footnote omitted)).
285. Id. at 430.
286. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341. As one commentator described the key facts of the case:
Poddar told the psychologist of his intent to kill someone (readily identifiable
as Tatiana) when she returned from Brazil. The psychologist and two psychiatrist
colleagues agreed that Poddar should be committed for observation in a mental
hospital. The psychologist notified the campus police orally and by letter. Three
police officers took Poddar into custody, but, satisfied that Poddar was rational,
released him on his promise to stay away from Tatiana. . . . [A supervising]
psychiatrist . . . then asked the police to return the psychologist’s letter and
ordered that no further action be taken to hospitalize Poddar.
Poddar stopped seeing his psychologist after the police detained him. He
continued to follow Tatiana, however . . . . [Ultimately,] Poddar went to
Tatiana’s home to speak with her. Tatiana was not there, and her mother told
Poddar to leave. He returned later that day . . . armed with a pellet gun and a
kitchen knife, and found Tatiana alone. When she refused to speak with him
and ran from the house, Poddar caught up with her and stabbed her to death.
Mossman, supra note 283, at 533 (footnotes omitted).
287. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 (“While the discharge of this duty of due care will
necessarily vary with the facts of each case, in each instance the adequacy of the therapist’s
conduct must be measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition of
reasonable care under the circumstances.” (footnote omitted)).
288. See Robert B. Kaplan, Comment, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California: Psychotherapists, Policemen and the Duty To Warn—An Unreasonable Extension
of the Common Law?, 6 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 229, 229 (1975); see also Michael L.
Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the 1990’s,
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lodged were that it (1) incorrectly assumed mental health providers could
accurately predict future violence;290 (2) compromised confidentiality, an
essential element for the success of mental health services, “by
decreasing [clients’] trust in their [treatment providers], by discouraging
[them] from communicating sensitive information [for] fear of subsequent
disclosure, and by causing [them] to prematurely terminate therapy
[because of] potential (or actual) breach[es] of confidentiality;”291 (3) would
result in “a net increase in violence” as fewer people would seek
treatment, or treatment, when sought, would be less effective as clients
would be more guarded in their disclosures; 292 (4) unfairly and
inappropriately branded persons with a mental disorder as dangerous;293
(5) forced clinicians to violate a “central . . . ethical precept,” namely,
attending first and foremost to the needs of their clients, with priority
instead given to the safety of the community;294 (6) would harm clients
as it would often lead to unnecessary and countertherapeutic involuntary
hospitalizations;295 (7) required warnings that might cause putative
victims unnecessary emotional distress or lead to preemptive retaliatory
violence;296 and (8) would lead therapists to refuse to see potentially
violent clients.297
In addition, there was considerable confusion among clinicians as to
the duty being imposed, triggered in part by the fact that the California
Supreme Court issued two Tarasoff rulings, with the first imposing a

16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 35 (1992) (noting “an ‘avalanche’ of largely critical academic
commentary” followed the ruling).
289. See Perlin, supra note 288, at 29 (citing Robert N. Cohen, Note, Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California: The Duty To Warn: Common Law & Statutory
Problems for California Psychotherapists, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 153, 153 (1978)); Kaplan,
supra note 288, at 230.
290. See Mossman, supra note 283, at 554; Perlin, supra note 288, at 36 (citing
Daniel J. Givelber et al., The Tarasoff Controversy: A Summary of Findings from an
Empirical Study of Legal, Ethical, and Clinical Issues, in THE POTENTIALLY VIOLENT
PATIENT AND THE TARASOFF DECISION IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 35, 37 (James C. Beck
ed., 1985)).
291. Perlin, supra note 288, at 36; see also Mossman, supra note 283, at 554; Kaplan,
supra note 288, at 237.
292. Kaplan, supra note 288, at 238.
293. Mossman, supra note 283, at 554.
294. Perlin, supra note 288, at 36 (quoting Givelber et al., supra note 290, at 37)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 36–37.
297. Id. at 37.
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“duty to warn”298 and the second establishing a “duty to protect”
prospective victims.299 Although the second ruling superseded the first
and provided mental health providers with a range of options to meet the
requisite duty “to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim,”300
the duty to warn language, with its more challenging and unsettling
requirement to track down and personally warn threatened third parties,
became part of the popular lexicon. Indeed, this confusion continues
relatively unabated.301
Clinicians were further alarmed by a series of subsequent rulings302
that they found “perplexing because of their inconsistency and
unpredictability,”303 appeared “to make little or no clinical sense,”304 and
not only interpreted Tarasoff more broadly, but also resulted in a lack of

298. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 555 (Cal. 1974),
vacated en banc, Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
299. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346; see also Karen Tapp & Darrell Payne, Guidelines
for Practitioners: A Social Work Perspective on Discharging the Duty To Protect, 8 J.
SOC. WORK VALUES & ETHICS 2-1, 2-2 to -3 (2011) (citing Tarasoff, 551 P.2d 334).
300. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340. The court stated that clinicians could, alternatively,
provide warning to “others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police,
or take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.” Id. The
latter has widely been construed to encompass seeking a client’s involuntary hospitalization
via a civil commitment petition. See Monahan, supra note 275, at 498. Although
controversial, see supra notes 274–75 and accompanying text, it has been suggested that
seeking outpatient civil commitment, where it is authorized, may provide another means
for a mental health provider to satisfy a Tarasoff duty. See Monahan, supra note 275, at
518.
301. See Yvona L. Pabian et al., Psychologists’ Knowledge of Their States’ Laws
Pertaining to Tarasoff-Type Situations, 40 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 8, 8 (2009)
(polling psychologists from four states on their knowledge of Tarasoff-related laws in their
states, and finding that most—76.4%—were misinformed about their state laws because
they believed they had a legal duty to warn when they did not or believed that a warning
was their only option when other protective actions less harmful to client privacy were
permissible).
302. Mossman, supra note 283, at 545 (“As troublesome as Tarasoff was, its legal
progeny were even more unsettling for therapists.”).
303. Tapp & Payne, supra note 299, at 2-3 (discussing a Michigan case where liability
was initially imposed even though there was no past record of violence and “[t]he plaintiff’s
sole piece of tangible proof was a notation made in a hospital record [two years
previously] documenting that the patient had made threats towards his mother” (citing
Davis v. Lhim, 335 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983))).
304. Matthew F. Soulier et al., Status of the Psychiatric Duty To Protect, Circa
2006, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 457, 457–58 (2010) (discussing five cases in
which, respectively, a victim was “well aware of the risk she ran by her behavior,”
Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983); an auto accident was caused by
a patient, Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); random victims were
shot in a crowded nightclub, Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb.
1980); an aunt was attacked by a patient who had never been violent or threatened his
aunt, Davis, 335 N.W.2d 481; and an auto accident occurred five-and-a-half months after
discharge and 500 miles away, Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988)).
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national uniformity regarding the requisite duty.305 Ultimately, Tarasoff
“influenced the legal requirements governing therapists’ duty to protect
third parties in nearly every state in the US.”306
With its seemingly broad mandate to protect third parties, encountering a
Tarasoff-like scenario has tended to strike fear in the hearts of mental
health providers,307 leading them to lobby for statutory protection from
such suits or at least guidelines on how to fulfill the duty to protect.308
The enactment of these statutes, now in place in at least thirty-seven
states, is also viewed as reflecting “a heightened appreciation . . . that
clinicians face an exceptional dilemma when confronted with patients
who make threats toward others,”309 although disagreement exists over
whether these statutes have provided “hoped-for clarity in defining [and
limiting] the duty to protect.”310
It is, however, now widely acknowledged that for a number of reasons,
Tarasoff-like rules were not ruinous to clinical practice.311 Among the
reasons given are that (1) mental health providers should be dedicated to
assisting all who are in need, including the potential victims of client

305. James L. Knoll IV, The Duty To Protect: When Has It Been Discharged?,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/forensic-psych/content/
article/10168/2087528 (“The broadest interpretation occurred in the 1980 case of Lipari
v Sears, Roebuck & Co. The case involved a VA patient who shot strangers in a crowded
nightclub, without ever threatening a specific person and a month after terminating psychiatric
treatment. The court rejected the Tarasoff limitation to an identified victim, imposing
not only a duty on therapists to predict dangerousness, but also a duty to protect unidentified
but ‘reasonably foreseeable victims’ in the general public.” (footnote omitted) (citing Lipari,
497 F. Supp. 185)).
306. Id.
307. Perlin, supra note 288, at 29–30 (“[T]he legend of the Tarasoff case has grown
to mythic proportions. . . . [E]mpirical surveyors have found that it has had a profound
impact on mental health practice even in jurisdictions where it is inapplicable. . . . [It is]
the subject of the most common questions directed to the American Psychiatric Association’s
legal consultation service.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Givelber et al., supra note 290, at
39–54; James C. Beck, The Psychotherapist’s Duty To Protect Third Parties from Harm,
11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 141, 147 (1987))).
308. Soulier et al., supra note 304, at 458; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117
(2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2.400.1
(2009).
309. Soulier et al., supra note 304, at 458; see also Knoll, supra note 305 (discussing
states’ duty to protect and “permission to warn” statutes).
310. Soulier et al., supra note 304, at 458; see also Tapp & Payne, supra note 299,
at 2–3 (“[O]nly in a few cases did courts construe the statutes to limit the duties owed to
third parties” (citation omitted)).
311. See Mossman, supra note 283, at 542; Soulier et al., supra note 304, at 460; Knoll,
supra note 305.
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threats,312 with most therapists having already embraced such a duty;313
(2) these duties resulted in a needed closer examination of clients’
potential for such behavior,314 which can enhance their treatment and
rehabilitation and help them avoid criminal and civil sanctions that
might otherwise ensue;315 (3) taking protective steps can actually “further
the therapeutic alliance and contribute[] to a [client’s therapeutic]
progress;”316 and (4) the scope of the duty was not as broad as commonly
believed.317
It has even been asserted that the Tarasoff duty “has [now] become a
central aspect of patient care,” with “practitioners . . . view[ing] the duty . . .
as they would other essential elements of care.”318 Practitioners were also
reassured when “courts began to reflect ambivalence about the extension
of the duty to protect” and typically “required that the threat be clearly
foreseeable and [established] that the duty extended only to ‘reasonably
foreseeable victims’ and not to the general public.” 319 Additionally,
312. See Soulier et al., supra note 304, at 460.
313. See Knoll, supra note 305.
314. See id. (quoting Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, “Where the Public Peril
Begins”: 25 Years After Tarasoff, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 214 (2000)).
315. Perlin, supra note 288, at 39.
316. Id.; see also Mossman, supra note 283, at 542 (“[I]n most cases issuing the
warning had a minimal or a positive effect on the psychotherapeutic relationship.” (quoting
Renee L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, Application of the Tarasoff Ruling and Its Effect on
the Victim and the Therapeutic Relationship, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1212, 1212 (1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
317. See Pabian et al., supra note 301, at 10–12.
318. Fox, supra note 283, at 475 (“I can scarcely conceive of a psychiatric interview in
which the patient’s risk to self or others is not addressed.”).
319. Knoll, supra note 305. See also Soulier et al., supra note 304, which surveyed
all Tarasoff-related appellate cases decided from 1985 through 2006 and found that fortyseven cases were decided in favor of the defendants, with only six for the plaintiffs—two
of which explicitly rejected Tarasoff as a basis for the verdict—and that the most common
reason given in ruling for the defendant was “the patient had not previously communicated to
the therapist a threat targeting an identified victim.” Id. at 461–69. In such cases, “the
courts almost always found that defendants owed no duty to the public at large.” Id. at
470. See, e.g., Brady v. Hopper, 751 F.2d 329, 330 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that psychiatrist
who treated John Hinckley Jr., who seriously injured the appellant in his attempt to
assassinate President Reagan, was correctly held not liable because Hinckley never conveyed
to the psychiatrist “specific threats against specific . . . victims”); Thompson v. Cnty. of
Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 737–38 (Cal. 1980) (en banc) (holding a therapist was not liable
where his patient named a “large amorphous public group of potential targets” rather
than a readily identifiable individual); Tedrick v. Cmty. Res. Ctr., 920 N.E.2d 220, 228
(Ill. 2009) (holding that care providers did not have an obligation to warn a patient’s wife
and noting “this court has rejected the rationale of the Tarasoff case”); Eckhardt v. Kirts,
534 N.E.2d 1339, 1344 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring the plaintiff to establish the patient
made “specific threat(s) of violence . . . directed at a specific and identified victim”); Adams
v. Bd. of Sedgwick Cnty. Comm’rs, 214 P.3d 1173, 1174 (Kan. 2009) (holding that
mental health providers did not owe a duty to those injured by an outpatient who became
violent nine months after treatment order expired); Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners, Inc., 969
A.2d 653, 654, 666–67 (R.I. 2009) (holding mental health provider not liable to the
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a recent line of cases is viewed as establishing that the “Tarasoff duty”
does not extend to persons who were aware of their danger.320 Thus,
while the Tarasoff duty remains a professional liability concern for
mental health providers, it is generally not seen to be as great a threat as
was once widely believed.321
Others, however, remain unconvinced,322 and have expressed concerns
that (1) confusion remains over the governing criteria, with the governing
duty remaining “in a persistent state of flux;”323 (2) the duty is difficult
or even virtually impossible to meet;324 (3) the obligation dominates and
corrupts clinical practice;325 (4) the requirement is unfair and unjust to
those in need of mental health services;326 (5) public safety has not been
victim of an assault by a voluntary outpatient last seen five months earlier as there was no
evidence the attack was foreseeable); Boren v. Texoma Med. Ctr., Inc., 258 S.W.3d 224,
230 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (holding duty not incurred when an emergency room patient
left and killed his ex-wife and two children the next morning but did not exhibit or indicate
behavior dangerous to others or make “any specific threat to injure his family or his wife’s
family”).
320. Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim’s Knowledge Shrinks the
Psychotherapist’s Duty To Warn and Protect, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 2
(2004); see, e.g., In re Estate of Votteler, 327 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa 1982) (holding
that plaintiff cannot recover damages if “the evidence has sufficient force to charge the
victim with knowledge of the danger”); Hinkelman v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 403 N.W.2d
547, 549, 551 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding psychotherapist’s duty to protect did not
arise because “the victim herself was aware of the danger” as a result of repeated
incidents in which the patient had threatened and even raped the victim before shooting
her to death at a later date).
321. Indeed, two high courts have explicitly rejected arguments that a Tarasoff duty
exists as a matter of common law in their states. Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 638
(Tex. 1999); Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 506 (Va. 1995).
322. Soulier et al., supra note 304, at 460 (“[C]ommentators have been deeply divided
on whether the legal duty the courts have articulated is good social policy or is mistaken.”).
323. Fox, supra note 283, at 474.
324. See id. at 476 (“[T]he clinician is forced to walk a razor-thin line”); Mossman,
supra note 283, at 602 (“The problem with the Tarasoff rule is that it presupposes that
assessments of dangerousness are yes-or-no predictions, whereas what mental health
clinicians have is the ability to assign persons to different levels of risk. To take action
. . . requires, in turn, a judgment about what level of risk is sufficient to justify the action.
But no court has provided guidance as to what this level of risk is . . . .”).
325. See Fox, supra note 283, at 476 (“Psychiatrists may resolve this tension by
limiting their assessment of threat. . . . [T]he psychiatrist may adopt a see-no-evil, hearno-evil, speak-no-evil approach.”); Mossman, supra note 283, at 527 (“[T]he implicit
obligation to protect the public is present in every clinical contact . . . .”).
326. See Mossman, supra note 283, at 602 (“Tarasoff is troubling in its willingness
to sacrifice the interests of patients for the sake of society. The same notions of fairness
and justice that prevent us from imposing confinement on people because they might
commit future crimes also tell us that undeserving patients should not suffer adverse
consequences for things they only have a probability of doing.”).
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enhanced as the required breach of confidentiality tends to end the
therapeutic relationship and prevents future clinical efforts that might
have defused the danger posed by the client;327 (6) these duties have
expanded the preventive detention and social control of individuals with
a mental disorder, including increased and improper use of psychiatric
hospital admissions;328 and (7) therapists’ cultural biases inappropriately
shape when protective efforts are undertaken.329
Furthermore, others assert that the Tarasoff duty and associated
litigation continue to expand,330 and even if a Tarasoff claim is rejected,
clinicians may be subject to a parallel lawsuit claiming they provided
negligent care to their client331 or face related disciplinary sanctions
from their licensure board.332 Recent cases causing clinicians renewed
concern have been issued in Colorado,333 Louisiana,334 and Michigan.335

327. See id. at 542–43 (citing Gutheil, supra note 282, at 353).
328. See Perlin, supra note 288, at 38–39.
329. See id. at 38.
330. See Tapp & Payne, supra note 299, at 2–5 (“Trends show an increase in the
number of lawsuits filed against social workers in the past 25 years.” (citation omitted));
Michael Thomas, Expanded Liability for Psychiatrists: Tarasoff Gone Crazy?, J. MENTAL
HEALTH L., Spring 2009, at 45, 45 (“[M]any clinicians will be troubled to learn the extent to
which Tarasoff liability has extended in some jurisdictions.”); see also Hubbard, supra
note 284, at 445 (“As neuroscience develops or discovers new avenues for exploring the
human brain, or ‘reading our minds,’ will the law demand even more intrusive or restrictive
measures to detect ‘unacceptable’ thoughts, impulses or inclinations?”).
331. Fox, supra note 283, at 475.
332. See id. (“[A Tarasoff-like case may impose an] ethics-based obligation to
protect third parties from patients who pose a risk. This duty can be viewed as an extension
of the principle of nonmaleficence, in which the psychiatrist [should] take[] reasonable
steps to protect the patient from the adverse consequences that can result from acting on
his violent impulses.”); Mossman, supra note 283, at 578 (“What is good for the [client]
must be sacrificed for the (greater) good of society. . . . [This] should be a source of ethical
discomfort . . . . In traditional medical ethics, doctors serve individual patients and have
fiduciary obligations to them, not to those around them.”).
333. See Fredericks v. Jonsson, 609 F.3d 1096, 1103–04, 1106 (10th Cir. 2010)
(affirming that the defendant, a psychologist who had completed an evaluation at the
request of the Colorado probation department, was shielded from liability by the Colorado
mental health professional liability statute, but extending the range of mental health
providers who owe a Tarasoff duty beyond those who have provided treatment to those
who have merely provided a mental health evaluation); see also John J. Maxey et al.,
Duty To Warn or Protect, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 430 (2011) (discussing this
ruling).
334. See Barbarin v. Dudley, 2000-0249 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/00), p. 5–6; 775 So.
2d 657, 660 (reading statute limiting liability to third parties narrowly to only protect
those mental health providers specifically listed by the statute); see also Soulier et al.,
supra note 304, at 471–72 (“[The case] that appeared troubling was Barbarin, in which a
non-mental health clinician warned a home nurse regarding a patient on the day of the
attack about a violent act that had occurred four years ago. The patient had not
communicated a threat since, but the [court] decided that the physician may still have
had a common law duty to protect the nurse, even though he had fulfilled the statutory
duty to warn.” (footnote omitted)).
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But arguably the recent case that has caused the greatest consternation
among mental health providers is a 2004 California Court of Appeal
ruling that determined that the communication of the client’s threat
triggering the duty to protect could come from someone other than just
the client. In Ewing v. Goldstein, a patient’s father had informed his
son’s therapist that his son had threatened to harm his ex-girlfriend’s
new boyfriend.336 The patient subsequently killed the boyfriend, and the
court ruled that this indirect communication of the patient’s threat could
suffice to impose on the therapist the duty to protect.337 The court stated
that “[a] communication from a patient’s family member to the patient’s
therapist, made for the purpose of advancing the patient’s therapy, is a
‘patient communication.’”338 One commentator wrote that this ruling
“expanded the criteria that trigger the duty to warn . . . and in its wake
has left confusion in the mental-health community about when and how
the duty arises.”339
In addition, “[b]y the late 1990s, . . . mental health professionals had
developed new views about the accuracy of violence predictions, which
led [some] to conclude that, contrary to what had [been asserted
previously], ‘clinicians are able to distinguish violent from nonviolent
patients with a modest, better-than-chance level of accuracy.’”340 These
335. See Dawe v. Dr. Reuven Bar-Levav & Assocs., 780 N.W.2d 272, 273 (Mich.
2010) (holding statute limiting liability to third parties for a failure to protect is not
applicable where a former patient entered the psychiatrist’s office and shot the plaintiff, a
current patient of the psychiatrist, and others participating in a group therapy session). In
addition, two older cases continue to cause mental health providers alarm. See Jablonski
v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983) (imposing duty notwithstanding that
there were “no specific threats concerning any specific individuals,” with the client’s
psychological profile and prior history of violence sufficient to trigger the duty to protect);
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 187–88 (D. Neb. 1980) (permitting a
suit after a patient shot strangers in a crowded nightclub without making any specific threats
and a month after terminating psychiatric treatment).
336. Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 2004).
337. Id. at 867–68.
338. Id. at 868.
339. Gwynneth F. Smith, Note, Ewing v. Goldstein and the Therapist’s Duty To
Warn in California, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 293, 293–94 (2006); see also Donald
A. Eisner, From Tarasoff to Ewing: Expansion of the Duty To Warn, 24 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHOL. 45, 45 (2006) (characterizing Ewing as a “significant expansion of the duty to
warn”); Soulier et al., supra note 304, at 459 (describing critical responses to the Ewing
decision); Smith, supra, at 319 (“The business of violence prediction is simply too fraught
with ambiguity to expect therapists to maintain client confidentiality while attempting to
navigate the murky waters of a hasty expansion of the duty to warn.”).
340. Mossman, supra note 283, at 555 (quoting John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial
Predictions of Violence, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
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predictions were further enhanced as “[t]he 1990s also witnessed the
beginnings and dissemination of a new approach to, or ‘technology’ for,
making violence risk assessments.”341 Although significant concerns
remain about a clinician’s ability to adequately assess risk and prevent
harm in a given case,342 these developments suggest that more may be
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 7-2.2 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997)); see also Monahan,
supra note 275, at 497 (“[T]he field of violence risk assessment has burgeoned and is
now a vast and vibrant area of interdisciplinary scholarship.”); Lisa J. Warren et al.,
A Clinical Study of Those Who Utter Threats To Kill, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 141, 141, 147–49
(2011) (finding that among 144 adults referred to a community-based forensic mental
health service for assessment following an explicit threat to kill someone that created a
fear of future violence in the person to whom the threat was made, 41.7% within twelve
months of their assessment committed an offense, including 22.9% who committed a
violent offense—including one homicide—and 12.5% assaulted the initial threat target,
including the one fatality; factors found to significantly increase the risk of subsequent
violence were a history of substance abuse, a history of violence, limited education, and
the absence of any mental health treatment during the study period; the combination of
these four factors predicted violence with a specificity of 87.4%).
341. Mossman, supra note 283, at 564; see id. at 565–66 (“Before 1990, most
studies of psychiatric violence prediction examined efforts in which mental health
professionals had used their ‘clinical judgment’ to gauge violence and make decisions
relevant to patients. . . . In the 1990s, mental health literature witnessed the publication
of several studies that described the capacities of actuarial ‘technology’ in assessing the
risk of future violence. . . . By now, the social science literature contains scores of
studies of actuarial prediction methods yielding results that imply well-above-chance
levels of predictive accuracy.”); see also Monahan, supra note 275, at 498–99 (“There
are two basic approaches to assessing the risk of violence. One approach, called
unstructured risk assessment, relies on the subjective judgment of people experienced at
making predictive judgments . . . . [R]isk factors are selected and measured based on the
mental health professional’s theoretical orientation and prior clinical experience. What these
risk factors are, or how they are measured, might vary from case to case, depending on
which seem most relevant to the expert doing the assessment. At the conclusion of the
assessment, risk factors are combined in an intuitive manner to generate an overall
professional opinion about an individual’s level of violence risk. The other approach,
termed structured risk assessment, relies . . . more on objective rules. Those rules specify in
advance at least which risk factors are to be measured in making a prediction and how
they are to be measured. In some forms of structured risk assessment, rules also govern
how the measured risk factors are to be combined to yield an overall estimate of violence
risk. In the most structured form of risk assessment, these actuarial estimates . . . are
offered as the final products of the risk assessment process: they are meant to replace,
and not to inform, professional judgment.” (footnotes omitted)).
342. See Monahan, supra note 275, at 500 (“Little has transpired in the intervening
decades to increase confidence in the ability of mental health professionals, using their
unstructured clinical judgment, to accurately assess violence risk.”); Mossman, supra
note 283, at 566 (“The available research also shows that actuarial measures are far from
perfect at distinguishing those individuals who will be violent from those who will
not.”). Furthermore, it has been pointed out that even if mental health providers have an
enhanced ability to predict violence, these predictions are only estimates of the likelihood of
violence and do not answer the basic question of when confidentiality should be breached and
what steps should be taken. See Hubbard, supra note 284, at 436 (“[A]nswering the
science question does not answer the policy question: what is the threshold of risk that
we as a society are willing to accept in order to avoid institutionalizing non-dangerous
people? . . . Therapists have little direction from courts or legislatures as to the level of
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expected of clinicians in preventing harm to third parties threatened by
their clients and that they will be expected to be aware of and proficient
in utilizing this new knowledge and these tools.343 Although it has been
suggested that clinicians may be afforded some protection by the fact
that few clinicians currently employ this more advanced approach,
commentators have also argued that this shield from liability may and
should be diminishing.344 In any case, consistent with other treatmentrisk that justifies—indeed requires—a particular protective measure, such as a warning.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Mossman, supra note 283, at 567 (“Tarasoff fails to recognize
that therapists do not have yes-or-no advance knowledge about whether a threat (or other
behavior) implies that a disclosure is necessary . . . . At best, therapists know about
probabilities or (more often) degrees of relative risk.”); id. at 577 (“[S]ociety cannot agree
upon what level of risk is ‘serious’ enough to trigger a Tarasoff-type response to future
danger. Moreover, it appears that there is no agreement about risk levels even among
judges.”); Michael R. Quattrocchi & Robert F. Schopp, Tarasaurus Rex: A Standard of
Care That Could Not Adapt, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 109, 133 (2005) (“There is no
reasonable evidence that warnings are effective in preventing harm. There is reasonable
evidence, however, to suggest that treatment prevents violence . . . .”).
343. See Hubbard, supra note 284, at 435 (“[B]reakthrough techniques in violence
risk assessment, if widely implemented, could alleviate many, but certainly not all,
objections to obligating mental health professionals to make violence predictions under
Tarasoff.”); Monahan, supra note 275, at 511 (“The post-Tarasoff scientific literature is
clear that structured risk assessment is superior to unstructured risk assessment in accurately
predicting violent behavior. . . . [But t]he literature on the incorporation of structured
risk assessment into the clinical practice of predicting violence . . . suggests that only a
minority of mental health professionals routinely employ structured risk assessment.”);
id. at 502 (“Courts as well as legislatures have become remarkably receptive to the introduction
of structured risk assessment tools . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Mossman, supra note 283,
at 566 (“[C]linicians who perform ‘risk assessments have a professional responsibility to
be aware of the advantages and limitations of using [these] tools.’” (quoting Thomas R.
Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 409, 438 (2001))).
344. See Monahan, supra note 275, at 514. Professor Monahan acknowledges that
mental health providers may be shielded from liability because only a small minority
employ structured violence risk assessment when predicting violence and “[i]n most states . . .
proving the standard of care [in a malpractice suit] means proving only what . . . mental
health professionals ‘customarily do under similar circumstances.’” Id. (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Philip G. Peters, Jr., Empirical Evidence and Malpractice Litigation,
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 757, 758 (2002)). Nonetheless, he points out that “[t]his situation
may be changing . . . [as] a growing minority of states have abandoned the custom-based
standard of care” and are employing “a reasonable physician standard . . . [that] provides
. . . less shelter for those adhering to antiquated customs.” Id. (quoting Peters, supra, at
758; Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 909, 967 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Professor Monahan’s view,
“more Tarasoff protection for clinical ‘innovators’ who use evidence-based structured
violence risk assessment, and less protection for clinicians adhering to the ‘antiquated
custom’ of using unstructured risk assessment, is exactly what the future should portend
for Tarasoff liability.” Id.; see also infra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
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related decisions, it has been suggested that mental health providers may
be able to minimize their liability exposure by seeking a related consult.345
Finally, more may be expected of mental health providers following
widely publicized tragedies such as the recent mass shootings in
Connecticut, Colorado, Arizona, and Virginia. In each of the postmortems
following these events, considerable attention has been given to
indications that the individuals responsible for these shootings suffered
from a mental illness and had previously received at least some mental
health services,346 with questions raised whether more effective mental
health interventions or additional steps taken by involved mental health
providers could have prevented these events.347 For example, subsequent to
the shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, a law was passed in New York
that “requir[es] physicians, social workers and other therapists to report

345. See Solomon M. Fulero, Tarasoff: 10 Years Later, 19 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. &
PRAC. 184, 186 (1988) (“Consultation provides evidence of professional consensus about
the action taken. A therapist is not liable for a negative outcome unless his or her actions
fall below the expected standard of care.”); Tapp & Payne, supra note 299, at 2–9 (advising
that social workers facing a Tarasoff-like scenario should obtain “contemporaneous
consultation”); Kaplan, supra note 288, at 242 (“[I]t seems prudent to suggest that a
therapist should always obtain a consulting opinion from another qualified psychiatric
specialist before deciding to warn a person who has been threatened by his patient.”); Knoll,
supra note 305 (“[P]ast therapists and referral sources should be queried where appropriate,
and consultations may be sought. If this type of careful, reasonable approach is taken . . .
then reasonable professional judgment has been demonstrated and clinician liability becomes
very unlikely . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also supra notes 146–47, 165, 190 and
accompanying text.
346. See Colleen L. Barry et al., After Newtown—Public Opinion on Gun Policy
and Mental Illness, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1077, 1077 (2013), available at http://www.nejm.
org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1300512 (discussing the highly publicized mass shootings at
Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Connecticut, the movie theatre in Aurora, Colorado,
the political meet-and-greet in Tucson, Arizona, and the campus of Virginia Tech University,
and noting these four events shared the common characteristic that “all four shooters
were apparently mentally ill”).
347. See, e.g., John Cloud, The Troubled Life of Jared Loughner, TIME (Jan. 15, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2042358,00.html#ixzz1We16V5Sq
(“[S]omeone at Pima Community College should have responded more directly to Loughner’s
warning signs . . . . The Loughner case is similar to that of Seung Hui Cho, who in 2007
shot and killed 32 people at Virginia Tech. . . . Schools should devote more resources to
students with obvious problems.”); Adam Clark Estes, Revelations About Adam Lanza’s
Mental Health Still Don’t Explain the Violence, ATLANTIC WIRE (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2013/02/revelations-about-adam-lanzas-mentalhealth-still-dont-explain-violence/62317/ (“Almost as long as we’ve known his name,
we’ve known that Adam Lanza struggled with some sort of mental illness.”); Erica Goode et
al., Before Gunfire, Hints of ‘Bad News’: In Colorado, Tracing the Trial of a Loner
Coming Apart, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2012, at A1 (discussing missed clues that “paint a
disturbing portrait of a young man struggling with a severe mental illness who more than
once hinted to others that he was losing his footing,” including that at one point, “his
psychiatrist . . . grew concerned enough that she alerted at least one member of the
university’s threat assessment team that he might be dangerous”).
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potentially dangerous patients to local health officials.”348 At the same
time, one positive aspect that may result is enhanced funding and support
for mental health services.349
X. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined a number of areas in which professional
liability claims pertaining to mental health care can be expected to
increase. Whereas practitioners were once insulated from litigation for
various reasons, these barriers are rapidly breaking down. As treatment
has vastly improved, the standard of care and the expectations of patients
and society have evolved. Injuries experienced due to the negligent
delivery of mental health care services are now increasingly likely to
generate a legal claim.
Mental health providers, clients, and society will likely have mixed
feelings about this evolution. On the one hand, it represents a triumph.
It indicates that clients are sufficiently recovered, empowered, and
supported that they can pursue claims against mental health providers for
inadequate care. In addition, these suits also suggest that mental health
care and its providers are gaining greater parity with their physical health
counterparts. However, mental health care in this country continues to be
underfunded, undersupported, and underappreciated. To the extent that
providers feel that the delivery of this care has become too onerous, it
may drive them from the field and make critically needed services less
available.

348. Brady Dennis & Lena H. Sun, After Newtown, Support for Mental-Health
Spending Grows, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/after-newtown-support-for-mental-health-spending-grows/2013/02/23/0d8d
75ca-7495-11e2-aa12-e6cf1d31106b_story.html.
349. Id. (“Mental-health advocates from coast to coast are seizing upon a rare and
unexpected chance to stem the years-long tide of budget cuts and plug gaps in the nation’s
patchwork mental-health-care system. In the wake of the massacre in Newton, Conn.,
lawmakers from both parties, along with notoriously tight-belted governors, are pushing to
restore some of the estimated $4.3 billion in mental-health spending that was slashed
from state budgets between 2009 and 2012.”); see also Brady Dennis & Paul Kane, Measure
Would Strengthen Mental Health-Care System, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/measure-would-strengthen-mental-health-caresystem/2013/02/07/dd64db44-714d-11e2-ac36-3d8d9dcaa2e2_story.html (“A bipartisan
group of senators, citing renewed urgency after the shooting massacre at Sandy Hook
Elementary School, introduced legislation Thursday aimed at strengthening the nation’s
fragmented mental health-care system and improving access at the community level.”).
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It should be noted that the debate over the impact of medical malpractice
liability on the practice of medicine and whether it improves or impedes
the quality of health care has raged for over a century and a half in this
country and continues to rage today.350 Although the full impact of
increased professional liability on mental health providers and mental
health care remains to be seen, greater attention must be given to its
emergence in light of the wide demand for and vital nature of these
services.

350. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, The Health Care Reform
Act of 2010 and Medical Malpractice Liability: Worlds in Collision or Ships Passing in
the Night?, 64 SMU L. REV. 735, 738–42 (2011).
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